Analysts’ EPS-decreasing exclusions and target price forecasts

Accepted at Management Science.

53 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2021 Last revised: 30 Nov 2024

See all articles by Stephannie Larocque

Stephannie Larocque

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business

Yong Yu

University of Texas at Austin

Wuyang Zhao

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management

Date Written: November 10, 2024

Abstract

We examine the relation between individual analysts’ EPS-decreasing exclusions (i.e., exclusions which result in lower street EPS forecasts than GAAP EPS forecasts) and the optimism of their target price forecasts. We document that analysts’ EPS-decreasing exclusions from their annual forecasts mainly relate to positive non-recurring items already reported by the firm. We find that analysts’ EPS-decreasing exclusions are associated with more optimistic target prices. Our results also suggest that analysts’ EPS-decreasing exclusions contribute to the optimism in their target prices by enabling analysts to project higher earnings growth. Further analyses reveal that the relation between analysts’ EPS-decreasing exclusions and target price optimism is attributable, at least in part, to analysts’ strategic incentives for issuing favorable valuations.

Keywords: Growth, Analysts, EPS-decreasing exclusions, Target prices, Strategic incentives

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JEL Classification: G10; M40; M41

Suggested Citation

Larocque, Stephannie A. and Yu, Yong and Zhao, Wuyang, Analysts’ EPS-decreasing exclusions and target price forecasts (November 10, 2024). Accepted at Management Science., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3691710 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3691710

Stephannie A. Larocque (Contact Author)

University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business ( email )

Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States

Yong Yu

University of Texas at Austin ( email )

1 University Station B6400
Austin, TX 78712
United States
(512)471-6714 (Phone)
(512)471-3904 (Fax)

Wuyang Zhao

McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management ( email )

1001 Sherbrooke St W
Montreal, Quebec h3A 1G5

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