Turkey’s recent engagements with rivals and adversaries, overcoming past tensions in pursuit of economic benefits, stand in contrast to Iran’s less flexible approach to diplomacy.
Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan, who recently met with Palestinian Leader Mahmoud Abbas, is expected to host Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the near future. Despite past conflicts, Turkey and Israel are engaging in negotiations about trade advancement and an energy-related agreement. The talks come despite continued strains over Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and a crisis in 2010 when Israel attacked a Turkish aid ship bound for Gaza, killing 10 Turkish citizens.
A decade ago, Erdogan was also estranged from wealthy Persian Gulf Arab states because of Turkey’s support for Arab Spring uprisings. Recently, however, Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The results of these visits included defense agreements with Saudi Arabia to buy Turkish drones and contracts worth over $50 billion with the U.A.E. Erdogan was accompanied by an entourage of some 200 businesspeople, highlighting the crucial role of trade in his itinerary. Such close and cooperative ties between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. would have seemed unimaginable just a few years ago.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia have historic differences over the leadership of the Muslim world but tensions escalated during the Arab Spring, particularly when Turkey offered support to the Muslim Brotherhood. The situation deteriorated further when both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates imposed a blockade on Qatar in 2017. Turkey chose to support Qatar, defying Saudi and Emirati sanctions. Relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia experienced additional strains following the Saudi-orchestrated murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018.
Turkey has a similar pattern of off-and-on relations with Egypt. After the Arab Spring and the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Turkey supported Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, who came to power in elections in 2012. A year later, however, Morsi was toppled in a coup by Gen. Abel Fattah el-Sisi. Turkey criticized Sisi and Erdogan called him an illegitimate dictator. Turkey subsequently became a center for exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood and hosted their media outlets, which criticized Sisi. In March, 2023, however, Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu traveled to Egypt for the first time in a decade, and the two countries are working to resolve their differences and improve relations.
Looking beyond the Middle East, Turkey maintains friendly relations with both Russia and Ukraine and brokered a deal that for months allowed Ukrainian grain exports to continue despite the Russian invasion. In fact, Turkey remains the only NATO member with significant ties to Russia. Turkey, along with India and China, has stepped up to purchase Russian gas and even agreed to pay for the gas in Russian rubles, refusing to embrace sanctions imposed on Russia by the U.S. and the European Union.
At the same time, Turkey has expressed support for Ukraine and provided Turkish-made drones to Ukrainian forces. Turkey has strategically utilized the Ukrainian war to bolster its diplomatic position and reap economic benefits. When Sweden and Finland sought NATO membership in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Turkey, which has veto power over NATO expansion, seized the opportunity to bargain for benefits, including the lifting of military sanctions imposed on Turkey after it conducted a military operation in Syria in 2019 against a Syrian Kurdish militia. Turkey also advanced its case to acquire F-16 aircraft from the U.S.
Erdogan has shown an ability to pivot when confronting dire economic problems, many of them self-inflicted. Facing annual inflation of close to 40 percent in part because of a stubborn refusal to raise interest rates before May 2023 elections, Erdogan has since sought to stabilize the economy and shore up regional and transatlantic relations.
Turkey’s neighbor, Iran, also faces severe economic challenges, including an annual inflation rate near 50 percent.
In recent months, Iran has succeeded in resuming relations with Saudi Arabia through Chinese mediation. However, significant economic benefits from this relationship still seem distant. Iran’s ties with Russia are not without controversy either. While Iranian politicians consider Russia a strategic partner, Russia’s recent siding with the United Arab Emirates on the issue of three islands long held by Iran in the Persian Gulf has angered many Iranians. From an economic perspective, many Iranians doubt that Russia, under Western sanctions itself, can significantly assist Iran’s economy. Additionally, Russia competes with Iran in the energy sector, offering tempting offers to traditional Iranian buyers such as India and China.
China has taken a similar stance on the issue of the Persian Gulf islands, aligning itself with Arab countries. This indicates that Iran cannot rely too much on China’s support. Iran and China have entered into a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement, but few details have been released and reaction to the agreement has been mixed. Critics have drawn comparisons with similar deals China has made with Sri Lanka and Pakistan and are concerned that it could lead to Iran’s exploitation. Since the agreement outlines only a general framework, specifics depend on future contracts, the timing of which remains uncertain.
Unlike Turkey, Iran has maintained largely adversarial relations with the United States since 1979 and has also been hostile to Israel, particularly since the 1990s, and to Egypt, with the brief exception of the Morsi presidency. With the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal following U.S. withdrawal in 2018 and growing tensions over Ukraine and human rights since the death of a young woman in police custody a year ago, Iran is also growing increasingly estranged from Europe.
Observing this broader picture, Iranians are keenly watching Turkey’s utilization of its foreign policy opportunities for national interests and economic benefits. Turkey has displayed remarkable flexibility in its approach, fostering cooperative ties with various states despite past tensions. Of course, Turkey benefits from its NATO membership while Iran is in a much less secure environment. However, Iran has also contributed to its own security dilemmas through intervention in support of armed militias in neighboring states.
Iran has also faced threats from its neighbors and global actors, and this feeling of insecurity intensified during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Many of Iran’s policies have been shaped by the experience of being the victim of aggression. Despite these differences, however, the decisions of leaders remain crucial. Astute leaders have the capacity to redefine policies based on their effectiveness and to rectify mistakes.
Mohammad Ghaedi, PhD, is a scholar and professorial lecturer at the Department of Political Science at George Washington University.
Turkish Pragmatism Contrasts with Iran’s Approach to Foreign Policy
By Mohammad Ghaedi
Middle East & North Africa
Turkey’s recent engagements with rivals and adversaries, overcoming past tensions in pursuit of economic benefits, stand in contrast to Iran’s less flexible approach to diplomacy.
Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan, who recently met with Palestinian Leader Mahmoud Abbas, is expected to host Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the near future. Despite past conflicts, Turkey and Israel are engaging in negotiations about trade advancement and an energy-related agreement. The talks come despite continued strains over Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and a crisis in 2010 when Israel attacked a Turkish aid ship bound for Gaza, killing 10 Turkish citizens.
A decade ago, Erdogan was also estranged from wealthy Persian Gulf Arab states because of Turkey’s support for Arab Spring uprisings. Recently, however, Erdogan visited Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The results of these visits included defense agreements with Saudi Arabia to buy Turkish drones and contracts worth over $50 billion with the U.A.E. Erdogan was accompanied by an entourage of some 200 businesspeople, highlighting the crucial role of trade in his itinerary. Such close and cooperative ties between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. would have seemed unimaginable just a few years ago.
Turkey and Saudi Arabia have historic differences over the leadership of the Muslim world but tensions escalated during the Arab Spring, particularly when Turkey offered support to the Muslim Brotherhood. The situation deteriorated further when both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates imposed a blockade on Qatar in 2017. Turkey chose to support Qatar, defying Saudi and Emirati sanctions. Relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia experienced additional strains following the Saudi-orchestrated murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018.
Turkey has a similar pattern of off-and-on relations with Egypt. After the Arab Spring and the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Turkey supported Mohamed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, who came to power in elections in 2012. A year later, however, Morsi was toppled in a coup by Gen. Abel Fattah el-Sisi. Turkey criticized Sisi and Erdogan called him an illegitimate dictator. Turkey subsequently became a center for exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood and hosted their media outlets, which criticized Sisi. In March, 2023, however, Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu traveled to Egypt for the first time in a decade, and the two countries are working to resolve their differences and improve relations.
Looking beyond the Middle East, Turkey maintains friendly relations with both Russia and Ukraine and brokered a deal that for months allowed Ukrainian grain exports to continue despite the Russian invasion. In fact, Turkey remains the only NATO member with significant ties to Russia. Turkey, along with India and China, has stepped up to purchase Russian gas and even agreed to pay for the gas in Russian rubles, refusing to embrace sanctions imposed on Russia by the U.S. and the European Union.
At the same time, Turkey has expressed support for Ukraine and provided Turkish-made drones to Ukrainian forces. Turkey has strategically utilized the Ukrainian war to bolster its diplomatic position and reap economic benefits. When Sweden and Finland sought NATO membership in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Turkey, which has veto power over NATO expansion, seized the opportunity to bargain for benefits, including the lifting of military sanctions imposed on Turkey after it conducted a military operation in Syria in 2019 against a Syrian Kurdish militia. Turkey also advanced its case to acquire F-16 aircraft from the U.S.
Erdogan has shown an ability to pivot when confronting dire economic problems, many of them self-inflicted. Facing annual inflation of close to 40 percent in part because of a stubborn refusal to raise interest rates before May 2023 elections, Erdogan has since sought to stabilize the economy and shore up regional and transatlantic relations.
Turkey’s neighbor, Iran, also faces severe economic challenges, including an annual inflation rate near 50 percent.
In recent months, Iran has succeeded in resuming relations with Saudi Arabia through Chinese mediation. However, significant economic benefits from this relationship still seem distant. Iran’s ties with Russia are not without controversy either. While Iranian politicians consider Russia a strategic partner, Russia’s recent siding with the United Arab Emirates on the issue of three islands long held by Iran in the Persian Gulf has angered many Iranians. From an economic perspective, many Iranians doubt that Russia, under Western sanctions itself, can significantly assist Iran’s economy. Additionally, Russia competes with Iran in the energy sector, offering tempting offers to traditional Iranian buyers such as India and China.
China has taken a similar stance on the issue of the Persian Gulf islands, aligning itself with Arab countries. This indicates that Iran cannot rely too much on China’s support. Iran and China have entered into a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement, but few details have been released and reaction to the agreement has been mixed. Critics have drawn comparisons with similar deals China has made with Sri Lanka and Pakistan and are concerned that it could lead to Iran’s exploitation. Since the agreement outlines only a general framework, specifics depend on future contracts, the timing of which remains uncertain.
Unlike Turkey, Iran has maintained largely adversarial relations with the United States since 1979 and has also been hostile to Israel, particularly since the 1990s, and to Egypt, with the brief exception of the Morsi presidency. With the collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal following U.S. withdrawal in 2018 and growing tensions over Ukraine and human rights since the death of a young woman in police custody a year ago, Iran is also growing increasingly estranged from Europe.
Observing this broader picture, Iranians are keenly watching Turkey’s utilization of its foreign policy opportunities for national interests and economic benefits. Turkey has displayed remarkable flexibility in its approach, fostering cooperative ties with various states despite past tensions. Of course, Turkey benefits from its NATO membership while Iran is in a much less secure environment. However, Iran has also contributed to its own security dilemmas through intervention in support of armed militias in neighboring states.
Iran has also faced threats from its neighbors and global actors, and this feeling of insecurity intensified during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Many of Iran’s policies have been shaped by the experience of being the victim of aggression. Despite these differences, however, the decisions of leaders remain crucial. Astute leaders have the capacity to redefine policies based on their effectiveness and to rectify mistakes.
Mohammad Ghaedi, PhD, is a scholar and professorial lecturer at the Department of Political Science at George Washington University.
Recent & Related