



2022 Arkansas School Safety Commission

Interim Report

August 2022



UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS SYSTEM

CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE

July 29, 2022

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Director of CJI
26 Corporate Hill Drive
Little Rock, AR 72205

Governor Asa Hutchinson
State Capitol Room 250
500 Woodlane Ave.
Little Rock, AR 72201

Dear Governor Hutchinson:

The 2022 Arkansas School Safety Commission, hereby submits its interim report for your consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

Dr. Cheryl P. May
Chair
2022 Arkansas School Safety Commission

Introduction

On March 1, 2018, Governor Asa Hutchinson, in the wake of the horrific school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida (February 14, 2018 with 14 students and three staff murdered and 17 others wounded), signed an executive order forming the Arkansas School Safety Commission (Commission). Governor Hutchinson's 2018 Proclamation is presented in Appendix A. The 18 members that served on the original Commission are provided in Appendix B. Governor Hutchinson appointed Dr. Cheryl May, Director of the University of Arkansas System's Criminal Justice Institute (CJI), as Chair of the Commission.

As required, the Commission provided Governor Hutchinson with [a final report](#) which included 30 recommendations (best practices) on November 30, 2018. A list of the original 30 recommendations of the Commission is presented in Appendix C.

On May 24, 2022, an attacker entered the Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas and murdered 21, including nineteen nine, ten and eleven-year-old students and two veteran teachers, and injured as many as 17 others. To complete the critical task of preventing Arkansas schools from experiencing tragic events such as the one that occurred in Uvalde, on June 10, 2022, Governor Hutchinson signed an executive order (see Appendix D) to reconvene the Arkansas School Safety Commission (2022 Commission) and appointed 24 individuals to serve as members. A list of the 2022 Commission members along with their subcommittee assignments is presented in Appendix E.

The 2022 Commission is tasked with the following duties:

- 1) Review the Commission's Final Report published in November 2018;
- 2) Provide an update on the status of school safety across Arkansas;
- 3) Update the analysis of the safety of K-12 schools throughout the state taking into consideration the physical and mental health of students;
- 4) Determine which findings and recommendations from the previous report have not been remediated and achieved;
- 5) Identify any new recommendations of best practices in school safety that have been developed since the Commission's final report in November 2018;
- 6) Submit an initial report and recommendations to The Governor on August 1, 2022 and
- 7) Submit the final report of the Commission's findings and recommendations to the Governor no later than October 1, 2022.

As 2022 members of the Arkansas School Safety Commission, we are tremendously grateful for Governor Hutchinson's leadership and his continuous passion, commitment, and dedication to making sure all of Arkansas's students are in safe and secure environments

and given the opportunity to reach their true academic potential. We are grateful for the opportunity to contribute to fulfilling his vision.

As Arkansans, we continue to be mindful of the profound pain and loss we experienced as a result of school shootings in our state. Since 1997, we have lost 6 students and one teacher and 13 students, teachers or staff have been wounded. In addition to Stamps High School (1997; 2 wounded) and Westside Consolidated Middle School near Jonesboro (5 fatalities and 10 wounded), three other school shootings have occurred, all since the Commission completed its work in November of 2018. On April 1, 2019 a 14-year-old eighth-grade student at Prescott High School shot and injured a 14-year-old fellow eighth grader. On April 24, 2019 a 14-year-old student at Concord High School shot himself and ended his own life in a restroom adjacent to the school cafeteria. On March 1, 2021 a 15-year-old student, in a premeditated attack, shot and killed a fellow 15-year-old classmate at Watson Chapel Junior High School. Our state's history of school violence and the heinous shootings at Robb Elementary School, Sandy Hook Elementary School, Columbine High School, Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, Santa Fe High School and unfortunately many others, illustrate the real vulnerability of our children in schools.

As members of the 2022 Commission, we are committed to working tirelessly to honor the victims of these tragedies and improve the recommendations of the original Commission to further help Arkansas schools develop school safety strategies to prevent, mitigate, respond to and recover from events of violence.

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2022 Arkansas School Safety Commission Activities

The inaugural meeting of the 2022 Arkansas School Safety Commission was held on June 14, 2022, in Room 151 at the Arkansas State Capitol. We are grateful to Speaker Sheppard and his staff for their extraordinary support that allowed Commission meetings to be live-streamed so our discussions can be seen by the public. We are also tremendously appreciative of Secretary Key and his staff for their relentless support of our activities. A special thank you is given to Ms. Angela Scaife for her continuous support of our efforts and the staff of Anthony Owens who continue to provide public access to our discussions through live streaming full Commission meetings.

During the 2022 Commission's initial meeting, Chair May organized members into the five original subcommittees and assigned the following individuals as chairs of each subcommittee:

- **Ms. Lori Poston:** *Mental Health and Prevention*
- **Director A.J. Gary:** *Audits, Emergency Operation Plans and Drills*
- **Sheriff Tim Helder:** *Law Enforcement and Security*
- **Chief Chris Chammond:** *Intelligence and Communications*
- **Director Tim Cain:** *Physical Securities*

Please refer to Appendix E for a list of members assigned to each subcommittee. In addition, Chair May invited several subject matter experts (SMEs) to assist Commission members in their subcommittee work. SMEs bring additional valuable knowledge and experience to each subcommittee. While non-voting members, SMEs have already made valuable contributions to our discussions. We are tremendously grateful for their time and input. A list of SMEs is also provided in Appendix E.

Full Commission meetings have been held on June 21st, June 28th, July 5th, July 12th, July 19th, and July 26th. All subcommittees have met once each week on the Wednesday, Thursday or Friday following each full 2022 Commission meeting. During full Commission meetings presentations were provided by key stakeholders to demonstrate the significant progress made and/or identify free school safety resources available to school districts. A list of the presenters are provided in Appendix F. We are very grateful to the three students (Mr. N'nambi Islam, Little Rock Southwest Magnet High School, Ms. Mary Emily Wrzensinski, Hamburg High School, and Mr. Webb Storer, Jonesboro High School) who spoke with us on July 19th. We are very proud of each of them and their open and honest dialogue. We hear you!

We are particularly grateful to the Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting of the Texas House of Representatives and their release of the [Interim Report 2022](#). This report provides an accurate account of the tragedy at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022. We applaud their work and release of this important candid report and vow the

information shared will be used to better ensure the safety and security of school students in Arkansas. This report will be referenced repeatedly in our presentation of potential new recommendations to be considered by the 2022 Commission. As with the original 2018 Arkansas School Safety Commission, we further emphasize the importance that all school districts, regardless of size, to implement **Comprehensive** school safety strategies and ensure the layering of these actions, policies, and procedures. There is not one solution that if implemented alone, will end the potential of violence in our schools. As indicated in the Robb Elementary Shooting Report numerous systemic failures at the school and in the actions of the responding law enforcement personnel contributed to the school's lack of preparation for and response to a potential armed attacker on campus. While the school had many of the right school safety policies and procedures in place, a culture of non-compliance contributed to a "relaxed vigilance on campus". While, as will be described below, Arkansas has passed numerous school safety laws since the 2018 Commission report, we must make sure there is accountability at the state, district, school, and staff levels to ensure our schools are vigilant in following these laws and their established safety and security policies and procedures. The Robb Elementary Shooting Report clearly demonstrates that if we do not insist on this accountability, the lives of our students are at risk.

Since the conclusion of the work of the original Commission, two critical articles concerning school shooters have been published by the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC). **Both studies indicate that school shootings are preventable.** The information provided in these studies will be critical in guiding our development and use of policies, procedures, tools, and programs to best ensure the safety of our schools. In 2019, NTAC published their research on targeted school violence¹ and closely examined 41 incidents in K-12 schools that occurred between 2008-2017. Key information from this report is provided below:

- No clear profile of a school attacker
 - Most were current or former students.
 - More than 80% were males.
 - 7th graders to seniors in high schools.
 - Many were absent from school before the attack and some were suspended.
 - Treated poorly by peers in-person and not just online; badly bullied.
 - They were grieved in some way.
 - Some sought fame.
 - Others were suicidal.
 - Had a history of discipline issues.
 - Had negative home life factors.
 - Had prior contact with law enforcement.

¹ https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Protecting_Americas_Schools.pdf

- Their behaviors concerned others but was not reported.

In 2021, the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) published their research on 67 averted attacks². Striking similarities can be seen between school attackers and students who plotted attacks. According to NTAC, these include:

- Both had histories of contact with law enforcement and of school discipline.
- Both had mental health issues (such as harming themselves and depression) and were bullied.
- Intended or committed suicide.
- Both used drugs or alcohol.
- Both were impacted by negative factors at home, such as parent's substance abuse, domestic violence, child abuse, parental incarceration or parental mental health issues.

Because of the importance of the report's key findings and implications, they are being listed verbatim below.

- ❖ **“Targeted school violence is preventable when communities identify warning signs and intervene.** In every case, tragedy was averted by members of the community coming forward when they observed behaviors that elicited concerns.”
- ❖ **“Schools should seek to intervene with students before their behavior warrants legal consequences.** The primary function of a threat assessment is not criminal investigation or conviction. Communities should strive to identify and intervene with students in distress *before* their behavior escalates to criminal actions.”
- ❖ **“Students were most often motivated to plan a school attack because of a grievance with classmates.** Like students who perpetrated school attacks, the plotters in this study were most frequently motivated by interpersonal conflicts with classmates, highlighting a need for student interventions and de-escalation programs targeting such issues.”
- ❖ **“Students are best positioned to identify and report concerning behaviors displayed by their classmates.** In this study, communication made about the attack plot were most often observed by the plotter's friends, classmates, and peers. Schools and communities must take tangible steps to facilitate student reporting when classmates observe threatening or concerning behaviors. Unfortunately, many cases also involved students observing concerning behaviors and communications *without* reporting them, highlighting the ongoing need for further resources and training for students.”

It should also be noted that in almost one-third of the cases (21/67), a SRO played a role in disrupting the attack plot.

² <https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2021-03/USSS%20Averting%20Targeted%20School%20Violence.2021.03.pdf>

Status of School Safety in Arkansas and Potential New Recommendations:

This section of our report will focus on the significant progress being made in the implementation of the 30 recommendations of the 2018 Arkansas School Safety Commission. While this progress will be documented by Commission subcommittees, there have been significant accomplishments that do not fit neatly under a single recommendation or even under a subcommittee. These notable accomplishments will be described below.

In 2017, The Arkansas Center for School Safety (the Center) was formed under the umbrella of the University of Arkansas System's Criminal Justice Institute (CJI) through a Memorandum of Understanding executed by Commissioner Johnny Key and Dr. Cheryl May. The Center was established to build the capacity of educators, leaders, and law enforcement professionals to meet the safety needs of children in public schools in Arkansas. Funding for the Center included federal and state grants as well as one-time monies from Governor Asa Hutchinson and Arkansas Attorney General Leslie Rutledge. In addition, the Center promotes and supports school safety statewide through training, education and resources for school district and law enforcement personnel. During the 92nd General Assembly of 2019, thanks to the support of Governor Hutchinson and the Arkansas legislature, CJI received base funding for the Arkansas Center for School Safety. Acts [620](#) and [648](#) of 2021 identified the Center as the state school safety clearing house, expanded access to private schools and established a 16-member advisory board, including 8 Governor-appointed members. Dr. Cheryl May, Director of CJI and the Center, provided a presentation to the 2022 Commission about the training and resources available through the Center on June 21, 2022. A copy of Dr. May's presentation, as well as all presentations to the Commission and subcommittees, are provided in Appendix G.

In 2019, Governor Hutchinson requested the Arkansas Center for School Safety (the Center) work with the Arkansas Division of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) and other key stakeholders to develop the 2019 School Safety Assessment and determine how well school districts have done in implementing the Commission's initial 30 recommendations. The Center contracted with UA Little Rock's Survey Research Center to administer the 106-question survey developed. An incredible 97% response rate was achieved. The results of the 2019 School Safety Assessment will be presented throughout this report.

The results of the 2019 School Safety Assessment were used to identify key implementation gaps and the foundation upon which proposed legislation was written and passed. The school safety legislation passed in 2019 and 2021 are detailed in Appendix H. We are very appreciative of DESE's Safe Schools Committee and their efforts in assisting with the framing of many of these pieces of legislation.

In order to get a more accurate picture of the status of school safety in Arkansas, a 99-question survey was developed by the 2022 School Safety Commission and again funded by

the Arkansas Center for School Safety and administered by UA-Little Rock's Survey Research Center. The results of this new school safety assessment and any new resulting recommendations will be included in the final report.

Mental Health and Prevention Subcommittee Interim Report:

As stated in the 2018 School Safety Commission Report, prevention efforts are critical in reducing the prevalence of school violence. These include early identification of at-risk students and detection of emerging threats. In the following section, we will review progress related to the previous recommendations of the Mental Health and Prevention subcommittee, as well as, share our preliminary additions or revisions to the previous recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Every school district should conduct school climate surveys across all campuses, and develop and implement an action plan based on the findings of the school climate survey.

Based on the 2019 School Safety Assessment, 60% of responding schools reported utilizing a School Climate Survey to assess their strengths and vulnerabilities, and to improve their awareness of potential risk factors related to bullying or other issues that negatively impact school climate. A thorough assessment of school climate in each building, with subsequent action planning by the building administration and other pertinent staff members, is highly recommended to ensure the identification of problem areas, and planning to address any identified issues is completed in a timely and an effective manner.

As a result of a state-wide climate survey roll-out by the Arkansas Division of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE), 63% of school districts chose to use the High Reliability Schools Level 1 survey beginning in 2019. Data were not readily available for alternative platforms used for school climate surveys or implementation of action plans. Consequently, questions included in the 2022 School Safety Survey will address this information gap. The final report will provide more detail on the progress made toward the recommendation.

Acts [620](#) and [648](#) of 2021 mandate that school site safety assessments are conducted by school districts every three years, the first no later than August 1, 2024. Conducting climate surveys are now included as part of the comprehensive school safety assessment process. In our subcommittee discussions between Commission members and Subject Matter Experts (SME's), we determined that schools could benefit from supplemental training regarding the action planning process. This should include information about ways to analyze data obtained from climate surveys, how to create an action plan to address areas of concern or needs, and how to monitor progress toward identified goals.

Revised Recommendation 1: DESE and the Arkansas Center for School Safety should work in collaboration to develop and provide training to schools on analysis of data and creating action plans to effectively address needs related to school climate.

In Arkansas, school districts have access to resources related to assessing the culture of their schools, as well as, help identify and address areas of need that impact students. High Reliability Schools provides a framework to guide schools in long-term strategic planning around key areas. Level 1 is focused on “Safe, Supportive and Collaborative Culture”. Additionally, the SHAPE assessment, developed through DESE’s Project AWARE, is available to help schools assess needs related to the mental health of students, and also provides resources that guide schools in action planning to meet these needs.

Recommendation 2: All school districts should implement a positive climate program that deters bullying behaviors, and promotes social-emotional learning and positive peer relationships.

In the 2019 School Safety Assessment, 60% of schools identified that they utilize a specific Social-Emotional Learning curriculum in their districts. Arkansas has historically ranked near the top in the nation in regard to the prevalence of bullying in our schools. Creating a culture in schools where positive peer relationships are taught and reinforced is a crucial piece of addressing bullying and other harmful behavior in our schools.

The Arkansas Division of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) has worked to develop innovations that support the work of implementing a positive climate program in schools.

G.U.I.D.E. for Life (Growth, Understanding, Interaction, Decisions, and Empathy)

This program is the work of 96 educators, representing 44 districts across the state. G.U.I.D.E. for Life serves as social/emotional learning standards, guiding instruction as academic standards have shaped core instruction. Counselors and educators can provide K-12 students with a five-step process to ensure personal success.

- 1) **Growth:** (*Manage Yourself*)
 - a) Develop problem-solving skills.
 - b) Practice mindfulness.
 - c) Persevere.
- 2) **Understanding:** (*Know Yourself*)
 - a) Increase self-awareness.
 - b) Know your strengths and weaknesses.
 - c) Develop critical thinking skills.
- 3) **Interaction:** (*Build Relationships*)
 - a) Treat others with respect.

- b) Communicate effectively.
- c) Seek out and offer help when needed.

4) **Decisions** (*Make Responsible Choices*)

- a) Consider personal beliefs, safety, and the situation.
- b) Think through potential consequences.
- c) Put your best self forward.

5) **Empathy** (*Be Aware of Others*)

- a) See other perspectives.
- b) Value the feelings of others.
- c) Appreciate diversity.

THRIVE Arkansas

The Division of Elementary and Secondary Education's THRIVE Arkansas is a collaborative project funded through the American Rescue Plan to support districts while developing and sustaining a multi-tiered support system to assess behavioral and mental health needs across a school, and create systems to support all students.

The project goals are as follows:

- 1) To increase coordination of efforts that support behavior and mental health services and programs.
- 2) Increase capacity in developing and sustaining evidence-based Multi-Tiered Systems of Support that address behaviors through a system of positive behavioral supports.
- 3) Develop the infrastructure that will best support the needs of the whole child.

In 2021, [Act 1084](#) supported schools in utilizing “evidence-based positive behavior supports.” THRIVE Arkansas launched in June of 2022, focused on providing training and support to schools in implementing school-wide positive behavior supports. In July 2022, the first cohort was trained, consisting of 93 schools representing 53 districts from across the state. The initial target group is district leadership. As part of the development process, they will be charged to return to their districts and create the district-wide framework, including building level leadership teams for further implementation. THRIVE Arkansas is funded with ESSER funds, and is currently funded through 2024.

Project A.W.A.R.E (Advancing Wellness and Resiliency in Education)

Project A.W.A.R.E. is a project which supports school districts in efforts to provide mental health care awareness and trauma informed practices (funded through the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration AWARE State Education Agency Grant).

The project goals are as follows:

- 1) To increase coordinated referrals, mental health services and programs, and follow-up for children.
- 2) Increase outreach and engagement among youth, families, schools, and communities to increase awareness, mental health identification, and implementation of services and programs.
- 3) Develop the infrastructure that sustains mental health among youth and maintain mental and behavioral health services when federal funding ends.

Some of the components of AWARE are:

- Provided Mini-Grants to districts to directly support Mental Health
- Promoting the use of the Shape Assessment (School Mental Health Assessment)
- Arkansas Aware Podcast

Project AWARE is funded by a 5-year SAMHSA grant, and is presently in year 4.

The Commission heard from several high school students who emphasized that early prevention, through teaching students healthy emotional development, key life skills, etc., is a key–yet underrecognized and under-resourced–aspect of preventing violence in schools by promoting and supporting students’ mental health from the earliest stages of development. There was also discussion about the stigma associated with mental health issues and seeking treatment in schools. Establishing a culture that promotes health and wellness of all and confronts stigma is crucial to having optimal student mental health.

Recommendation 3: All school districts should provide access to training in Youth Mental Health First Aid for all personnel who interact with students. Additional school personnel training may include: Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs), Trauma-Informed Schools, Drug-Endangered Children, and Social-Emotional Learning.

In response to this recommendation, there have been some significant progress made in Arkansas:

- Act [620](#) and [648](#) of 2021 requires all school counselors to complete YMHFA training every four years.
- Act [551](#) and [622](#) of 2021 requires all school resource officers to complete YMHFA training every 4 years.
- To date, the Arkansas Center for School Safety staff has trained 611 SROs and school counselors.

- DESE's Project AWARE has trained 2,500 educators, counselors, and community members in YMHFA
- UAMS: Arkansas Building Effective Services for Training (ARBEST); Trauma Resource Initiative for Schools (TRIS) have provided training, support and resources to our schools, so they can more appropriately respond to traumatic events in our schools and communities.

The subcommittee heard from administrators from Greenbrier School District about the impact of Youth Mental Health First Aid in their district. They are determined to go beyond the requirements from Acts [620](#) and [648](#) of 2021 and train other staff. They have two certified YMHFA trainers within the district. Below please find comments from Dr. Benish, Director of Mental Health Services & Behavioral Services for the Greenbrier School District:

Positive mental health and well-being is associated with increased academic success, better attendance rates, positive relationships, good problem-solving skills, and overall resilience just to name a few. But many of our students need help developing and maintaining a healthy mindset. School is naturally a good location for mental health support because our children and youth spend a majority of their time there. Many mental health difficulties begin during the school ages. From research we know that the onset of about half of all diagnosable mental illness occurs before adulthood with about a third occurring before the age of 14. Positive mental health is the foundation for learning in many cases. In Greenbrier, we are committed to making a difference by implementing a comprehensive system of mental health support in our schools. Our children come first and we are committed to educating and supporting the whole child academically, behaviorally, socially and emotionally.

Our goal is to develop and maintain a comprehensive system of support that includes early identification and makes school based mental health services easier to access for our families and youth in Greenbrier. Education and awareness of mental health difficulties are vital to the process. With programs like Youth Mental Health First Aid (YMHFA), we are providing that knowledge and equipping adults with the skills they need to recognize the signs and symptoms of mental health difficulties early on. With this program, our staff learn about warning signs of mental illness and substance abuse. They become familiar with common mental health disorders and learn how to intervene to get youth the help they need both as symptoms arise and in crisis situations.

Educating our staff with Youth Mental Health First Aid has a broad impact. We are dispelling myths about mental illness and reducing the stigma associated with it. Our staff commonly report feeling increased confidence to intervene and better knowing how to help our young people after receiving the training.

Since 2019, we have acquired trainer certification for two counselors, two directors and one intern who have conducted about 20 trainings in the district. We have trained approximately 395 participants, both school staff and community members who fill various roles in a young person's life including teachers, administrators, counselors, resource officers, bus drivers, custodians, computer technicians, school board members, parents, youth pastors, and administrative staff. It is our goal that all staff who work with children and youth receive training in this very important program and we are very close to reaching that goal.

- Dr. Tricia Benish
Licensed Psychologist
Director of Mental Health & Behavior Services,
Greenbrier School District

The availability of training in Arkansas for YMHFA was discussed. It is required for Counselors and SRO's, but the group agreed that **all certified and classified school staff need access to mental health awareness training**. In 2021, a 1-hour basic mental health awareness course was developed by Dr. Betsy Kindall, Lori Poston and Linda Graham to increase basic mental health awareness for all school personnel and made available online through the [Arkansas Center for School Safety](#).

Revised Recommendation 3: All school districts should provide access to training in Youth Mental Health First Aid for all personnel who interact with students. All districts should also have at least one YMHFA trainer, to promote sustainability and ongoing staff development. Additional school personnel training may include: Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs), Trauma-Informed Schools, Drug-Endangered Children, and Social-Emotional Learning.

New Recommendation: We recommend that all classified school staff take the free online 1 hour Mental Health basic awareness class, "Basic Mental Health Awareness for Educational Staff."

Additional resources in Arkansas that improve communication between schools and community partners to create a more trauma informed response to situations are as follows:

UAMS Trauma Resource Initiative for Schools (TRIS)

TRIS partners closely with ADE to offer specialized consultation to schools impacted by traumatic events. Specifically, TRIS and ADE developed a shared response protocol with the Department's Counseling and Guidance leadership as a means to ensure a coordinated response to schools. Common focus areas of consultation include developmentally appropriate communication about traumatic events to students, steps to take in the immediate aftermath of an event to mitigate trauma, signs and symptoms that students or staff may need more support, and how to access trauma-focused mental health support.

CJI's Maltreatment and Drug Endangered Children Initiative

According to the National Threat Assessment Center reports, both school attackers and students who plotted attacks were impacted by negative factors at home such as a parent's substance abuse, domestic violence, child abuse and parental incarceration. According to the Investigative Committee of the Robb Elementary Shooting, the parent of the Uvalde attacker was struggling with a substance use disorder. The Maltreatment and Drug Endangered Children Initiative focuses on the early identification of children who are maltreated. A very large percentage of these children live in homes where parents are engaged in illicit drug activities including substance abuse. These children are referred to as drug endangered children and are most commonly neglected, but are also at-risk of physical and sexual abuse. According to the Children's Bureau, 73% of children who died from maltreatment suffered neglect. Early identification of children at risk of maltreatment in this initiative are identified through collaboration between local and county law enforcement, child welfare workers, community correction professionals and schools. Through information sharing between law enforcement and child welfare, histories of domestic violence and substance abuse, which often go undiscovered, can be identified. Once at-risk children are identified, children and families are provided opportunities for needed services. The ultimate goal of this initiative is to break the cycle of child and drug abuse in these families through early intervention. Local and county law enforcement, Arkansas Division of Children and Family Services, Arkansas Division of Community Correction and schools are the critical partners in this initiative. Currently this initiative has been implemented and successful in 8 counties.

One important element of the Maltreatment and Drug Endangered Children Initiative is the PAYcheck (Protecting Arkansas Youth) Program. Often times there are negative experiences in a student's life outside of school that can have an impact on their behavior at school. And, far too often the school is not aware of any of these events. The PAYcheck program is designed to increase the communication between local schools and local and county law enforcement, children and family services and community correction and reduce the trauma experienced by children in these homes. If a child's parent is arrested, for example, a notification is set to the school indicating the child has been traumatized. It does not provide the circumstances of the trauma. This notification alerts school personnel and if the child acts out or has difficulty with completing assignments, they are brought to the attention of the school counselor rather than disciplined. In order to reduce the amount of trauma experienced by the student, CJI will be working with UAMS/TRIS to develop and deliver trauma informed response training for school and law enforcement professionals. While the PAYcheck program has been implemented in 8 counties, the intent is to implement the program statewide this fall. More details concerning this program will be contained in the final report.

Recommendation 4: All school districts should establish a behavioral threat assessment team, following best practices for team composition and process and require all team members receive basic and advanced behavioral threat assessment training through the Arkansas Center for School Safety.

Since the report was released in 2019, the following have occurred:

- The Center received a Bureau of Justice Assistance Stop School Violence Grant in 2019 and provides Basic and Advanced Behavioral Threat Assessment (BTA) training, developed online basic class, tool kit, and draft policy.
- Basic BTA - 10 classes delivered (307 attendees) with 76 school districts participating.
- Advanced BTA - 1 class delivered with 13 school districts participating.
- 45% of school districts indicated they utilize an anonymous reporting system.
- 28% of school districts have established a behavioral threat assessment team. Of those who report having a BTA team, 66% reported that all their team members completed training in conducting behavioral threat assessments.

The Mental Health/Prevention subcommittee heard presentations from Fort Smith School District and Springdale School District regarding their anonymous tip lines and behavioral threat teams and processes. Based on our review of the information from districts that have successfully created a mechanism for anonymous or confidential reporting of concerning situations or behaviors at school, along with a defined process for behavioral threat assessment teams and processes, it is our recommendation that a separate recommendation be added to address the establishment of an anonymous or confidential tip line for student safety. Based on our review of the information, any district using an anonymous or confidential school safety tip line must have appropriately trained behavioral threat assessment teams that meet national best practices for team composition and processes.

Behavioral Threat Assessment Team training is currently available FREE to all schools through CJI/ACSS. This training is best practice in Arkansas, and is highly recommended for all identified team members. Engaging families in the team and discussion about needs can strengthen their engagement and commitment to the treatment process, can add accountability and provide an opportunity to share successes and improvements, as well as to revise the plan as needed to achieve the best outcomes.

The Commission heard a presentation from Cindy Marble, a former Special Agent with the Secret Service, regarding Behavioral Threat Assessments. She does extensive training regarding assessing threats in schools. She shared the critical pieces of a thorough threat assessment, including identification and definition of the concerning behavior, to determine what causes may be there. This allows identification of needs and intervention prior to threats occurring, which is the best possible outcome. She shared about a specific court case³ involving a behavioral threat assessment process that was not conducted appropriately, which involved inadequate response to bullying and ultimately led to a student being shot. The school was found 54% liable, as the threat assessment process did not involve a team, nor was there any recommendation of services for the student or follow

³ <https://cases.justia.com/california/court-of-appeal/2022-f079926.pdf?ts=1648231252>

up regarding the recommendations made. We believe this supports the recommended best practice of designation of a multidisciplinary team, along with training in an approved model of threat assessment and plan development.

New Recommendation: To create a School Safety Tip Line Committee that will investigate strategies used in other states and best practices to establish and implement a statewide School Safety Tip Line for Arkansas.

Over the past several years, the Commission Chair and other subcommittee members have investigated and studied models in other states for anonymous or confidential reporting of school safety concerns. The subcommittee evaluated the 2021 report, “School Safety Tip Line Toolkit” (Tip Line Toolkit), which reported that:

- 1) Just over half (51%) of public middle and high schools in the United States currently have a tip line in operation.
 - a) *Most tip lines are relatively new. Sixty percent have been in operation for less than 3 years.*
- 2) Principals perceive tip lines as an effective school safety strategy, addressing multiple threats:
 - a) *Seventy-seven percent believed that their tip lines made them more aware of safety issues at their school.*
 - b) *Over 50% said that their schools’ tip lines had prevented violent incidents.*
 - c) *Two-thirds believed that their tip lines allowed their schools to respond more effectively to bullying.*
 - d) *Seventy-three percent reported that their tip lines had prevented incidents of self-harm or suicide.*
- 3) Over half of tip lines are staffed or monitored 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, such that a staff member receives calls, texts, or other entries in real time.
- 4) Most are described as anonymous rather than confidential.
- 5) Most schools involve school administrators (89%) and law enforcement officers (56%) in their tip line programs, but only about 25% involve mental health professionals or students as active partners.
- 6) The most common challenges to operating a school safety tip line include the following:
 - a) *Receiving tips with insufficient information to act on*
 - b) *Raising student awareness and getting students to submit tips – Identifying false or bogus submissions*
 - c) *Receiving tips for situations that are considered out of scope*

d) Raising community awareness

This statewide tip line should facilitate the ability of Arkansas's students and parents to anonymously (or confidentially) report threats to student safety. In addition, the tip line should also serve as a means for students and parents to report and access help for a range of challenges to a safe learning environment, such as bullying and harassment, concerns about suicide and self-harm, and related concerns. While the tip line would not serve as a substitute for school counselors or school-based or community-based mental health care, the school safety tip line will serve as another layer in a safety net that our students deserve when they have unmet needs for support.

To reiterate, the purpose of both the behavioral threat assessment teams and the statewide tip line is to support our students—to identify students at risk as early as possible, and to provide timely and appropriate support and resources, including mental health services.

Experts emphasized that punitive responses to reported or perceived threats, in contrast, can have the opposite effect, by deterring reporting and further alienating the most vulnerable, at-risk students and families.

Recommendation 5: The Arkansas Department of Education should review roles and responsibilities of school counselors to provide increased time with students for provision of counseling and social-emotional learning, as well as referral to community resources as appropriate.

[Act 190](#) of 2019 mandated that all school counselors must spend 90% of their time in direct service to students. The Commission's intent behind this recommendation was to appropriately utilize time that counselors spend with students each day, to ensure the best use of their specific skills and training to benefit students in the schools they serve. We do recommend ongoing monitoring by school administration, to ensure the appropriate use of counselor time. This recommendation has been accomplished.

Recommendation 6: A coordinated crisis response team should be developed to mitigate the emotional impact of any traumatic event that impacts a district.

The 2018 Arkansas School Safety Commission recommended a designated process be implemented utilizing trained personnel from across the state. These individuals or teams would be tasked with responding to critical incident events in an organized and efficient manner.

Since 2019, staff members from the Arkansas Division of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE), the Criminal Justice Institute (CJI) and Arkansas Center for Safe Schools (ACSS) have researched and reviewed crisis response training models. The **National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA)** was recently designated as the crisis response model which will be utilized to train teams who can provide critical education and emotional first aid training in mass casualty, natural disasters or other events which impact Arkansas schools and communities.

The Arkansas Division of Elementary and Secondary Education designee should serve as the point of contact, and should collaborate with NOVA personnel, school districts and other key stakeholders to provide crisis response training and services.

NOVA provides disaster relief to victims of crime, victims of mass casualty events, or survivors of natural disasters in the form of crisis response. The goal is to assist victims and survivors to understand and normalize their reactions to increasingly abnormal situations and allow them to begin their physical and emotional recovery.

Crisis response is a key element of fulfilling NOVA's mission to champion dignity and compassion for those harmed by crime and crisis. Trauma has common reactions but the cause of the trauma, from wide-area natural disasters to multiple victim crimes of violence, have different layers and dimensions. There are organizations that focus on crime victim advocacy and others that deal with disaster relief. NOVA is unique in that it incorporates extensive skill and experience in training a vast network of responders in a broad range of needs that stem from criminal, man-made and natural crisis victimization.

NOVA'S long term goal for the continued stabilization of an impacted community entails three primary tasks:

- 1) Provide direct services through individual and group crisis intervention sessions as well as family companioning during the immediate aftermath of a mass casualty or natural disaster;
- 2) Assist local officials and other decision-makers to plan for immediate and long-range care, comfort and assistance for victims, first responders and survivors within their communities.

- 3) Train and support local community caregivers who may be called upon to provide long-term assistance to their communities after NOVA has departed, enabling the community to be self-sustainable.

The first NOVA training will be held in the fall of 2022, thanks to a Bureau of Justice Stop School Violence grant awarded to DESE in 2019, with regional crisis response training scheduled to begin in October 2022. Information is being disseminated to school district administrators and key stakeholders within those districts ie: administrators, school counselors, school psychology specialists, school security directors, building and district crisis team leaders or other personnel designated by the school districts. It should be noted that first responders in Arkansas are also NOVA trained across the state, and may be an additional resource to schools in the event of a crisis.

Revised Recommendation 6: NOVA crisis response training should be made available to school personnel and key stakeholders throughout the state and ensure all school districts receive relevant training information in a timely manner.

The NOVA community crisis response model has been designated as the primary training process for schools in the State of Arkansas. There are other crisis response models and initiatives currently in place or available which can serve to enhance and expand the skill set of the NOVA trained responder.

ADDITIONAL CRISIS RESPONSE MODELS AND INITIATIVES:

Project A.W.A.R.E (Advancing Wellness and Resiliency in Education)

Project A.W.A.R.E. is a project which supports school districts in efforts to provide mental health care awareness and trauma informed practices (funded through the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration AWARE State Education Agency Grant).

Trauma Resource Initiative for Schools (TRIS)

The UAMS Trauma Resource Initiative for Schools (TRIS) partners closely with ADE to offer specialized consultation to schools impacted by traumatic events. Specifically, TRIS and ADE developed a shared response protocol with the Department's Counseling and Guidance leadership as a means to ensure a coordinated response to schools. Common focus areas of consultation include developmentally appropriate communication about traumatic events to students, steps to take in the immediate aftermath of an event to mitigate trauma, signs and symptoms that students or staff may need more support, how to access trauma-focused mental health support, etc.

Of note, the Commission heard from Dr. Nikki Edge of UAMS, who explained that TRIS utilizes the now-standard-of-care framework disseminated by the National Child Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN), called the NCTSN System Framework for Trauma-Informed Schools:

“NCTSN System Framework for Trauma-Informed Schools provides strategic guidance in order to achieve the vision of a trauma-informed school described above. It is not a prescriptive roadmap for a one-size-fits all approach. Instead, it includes core areas that will help to focus educational system improvements and organizational changes. These core areas can be applied to each of the three intervention tiers to create a trauma-informed environment within the school system while identifying those who are at risk or might need more intensive support to address their traumatic stress or loss symptoms.”

“Although the framework attempts to break down the complexity of a school system and its environment into discrete components, no single core area should be viewed in isolation. Only in totality can the framework serve to help create, support, and sustain a trauma-informed school.¹⁰ The framework for trauma-informed schools that follows applies to Pre/K-12. It is rooted in the Multi-Tiered Systems of Support (MTSS)¹⁰ framework pyramid, which is a multi-tiered approach for the early identification and support of students with learning and emotional/behavior needs. The framework not only infuses all three tiers of the MTSS (see diagram below) with trauma-informed concepts and practices, but it also recognizes and addresses the broader contexts in which these tiers operate: school environment/culture, community, and family partnerships.”

“Within each of these tiers are strategies that are critical to creating a trauma-informed school. These include practices that influence the day-to-day interactions among educational staff, students and families, organizational policies and procedures, and community capacity-building strategies. All of these—inside the school and in the family and community contexts—are essential to support the overall culture, practice, and structures for a trauma-informed school. While it is noted that education and mental health perspectives for serving student social/emotional needs may differ, the following framework is intended to integrate these perspectives and highlight the core areas necessary to implement and sustain trauma-informed practices in a school.”

PrePARE

The National Association of School Psychologists PrePARE curriculum provides relevant school personnel with comprehensive training on how to establish and serve on school safety and crisis response teams. The training integrates the roles of school staff members and community providers in terms of prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery.

Prevent and prepare for psychological trauma

Reaffirm physical health and perception of security and safety

Evaluate psychological risk

Provide interventions

Respond to psychological needs

Examine effectiveness of crisis prevention and intervention

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS/CONSIDERATIONS:

In discussing gaps related to Mental Health and Prevention, the issue of access to mental health for all students continues to be inconsistent across Arkansas. This is especially problematic in our more rural parts of the state, where there are fewer providers and less resources for agencies who have extreme workforce shortages. The growth of the use of telehealth has been a resource for some areas, but there remain areas of the state where connectivity is poor or non-existent. The school is often the only possible means for delivery of telehealth services in those situations, being the sole source of internet accessibility for some students.

Some schools have providers who serve students onsite or in their communities, while other schools have limited or no access to providers in their communities. Outreach to providers who serve rural areas is imperative, to build partnerships to improve access to mental health treatment to at-risk students. Behavioral Threat Assessment teams need mental health representation, if developed according to best practice. This is a crucial partnership to ensure all students receive the support and treatment to meet their needs.

New Recommendation 7: All students should have access to needed mental health services, whether in person at school or via telehealth.

Law Enforcement and Security

Subcommittee Interim Report:

Recommendation 1: No campus should ever be without an armed presence “AT ALL TIMES” when staff and children are attending class or a major extracurricular activity.

We anticipate recommending the addition, “AT ALL TIMES”, to the full Commission.

While 84% of school districts indicated they have armed presence on all campuses in the 2019 School Safety Assessment, discussion pertaining to the accuracy of this survey question generated the need to clarify what a “campus” is. In 2018, the intent of our subcommittee was to have armed security within each building, i.e. Elementary School, Middle School, Junior High School and High Schools. This subcommittee is of the opinion school districts did not fully understand our intent. Consequently, a more descriptive question was included in the 2022 School Safety Assessment and the results will provide more meaningful information. With initial reports and anecdotal evidence, we believe that most school districts do not have an armed presence in every school. Either districts could not afford the cost of School Resource Officers (SROs) or Commissioned School Security Officers (CSSOs) or the district was opposed to arming additional personnel (SROs or CSSOs). In the 2019 School Safety Assessment, while 79% of districts indicated having at least one SRO, only 20% of the districts indicated they had an SRO on all campuses. Only 20 districts indicated that they have established CSSO programs. Compounding this issue further, if there is an armed presence, it is periodically interrupted due to the SRO (if only one) having responsibilities elsewhere in the district, or other responsibilities within the community that remove them from the school. There will be questions on the 2022 School Safety Assessment that will provide additional data to better determine the scope of this issue and help direct any additional recommendations.

When reflecting upon the Uvalde, Texas school shooting, it is possible that had armed security been inside the school when the attack began, the shooter may have been thwarted, perhaps before ever entering the school. This subcommittee believes very strongly that an armed presence in every school within a district is a must. The committee gave several options for school districts to explore in their efforts to provide their students with armed security. These options will be reviewed in this report.

Recommendation 2: If financially practicable, schools should ideally have at least one SRO for each campus.

Progress Made. Based on data from the Arkansas Center for School Safety, there are now 460 SROs throughout the state, with 223 total districts using SROs. The number of SROs (315) has increased significantly since the initial survey conducted by the Commission. However, at the time of the initial school safety assessment, only 20% of districts indicated they had SROs on all campuses. The financial practicability of having an SRO on each

“campus” should be better answered in upcoming survey after the definition of “campus” was clarified.

This recommendation dovetails with the first requiring armed security on every school campus within a district. Because this recommendation states, if financially practicable, the committee is signaling that this is an important goal, but it is not as crucial as having some form of armed security in every school. Obviously having a school resource officer on a campus does provide armed security, but it also provides the campus with a valuable tool. When properly trained a SRO can build bridges between students and the police that can be incredibly beneficial in helping to provide and increase the level of security for the school. We recognize that a SRO can be a powerful mentor and role model for the students they serve. They can also play an important role when schools are training staff to recognize and react to security threats. If funding can be found, placing a SRO in every school is recommended.

Recommendation 3: School districts should execute a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with their partnering law-enforcement agencies that identify the roles and responsibilities of SROs and other critical elements.

This recommendation became law with the passing of Acts [551](#) and [622](#) of the 2021 regular session and requires a school district that accepts a SRO to enter into a memorandum of understanding with the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction. The University of Arkansas System’s Criminal Justice Institute and Arkansas Center for School Safety (the Center) in collaboration with other key stakeholders including DESE’s Safe Schools Committee developed a model MOU that must be used by school districts when obtaining the services of a SRO from a local or county law enforcement agency. School districts that form an institutional police department must use this model MOU to develop mirroring policies and procedures for any sworn police officers on campus during the instructional day (SROs). A copy of the model SRO MOU can be found at www.arsafeschools.com.

Recommendation 4: SROs whose primary assignment is within the school should receive specialized training.

Acts [551](#) and [622](#) also include training requirement for all SROs. These include, a 40-hour basic SRO course, Youth Mental Health First Aid certification every four years, a SRO refresher course every five years after completing the basic SRO course and 12 hours of continuing education in school safety annually. In addition, superintendents and administrators with direct supervision responsibilities of a SRO must take a course on SRO roles and responsibilities. The Arkansas Center for School Safety (the Center) provides all needed courses (in-person and online) for SROs or administrators (www.arsafeschools.com) to meet these requirements. The Center is responsible for ensuring compliance in these laws and a district can lose the ability to use a SRO if these training requirements are not met.

We anticipate recommending a requirement that at least all SROs and CSSOs participate in regular Active Shooter training (i.e. ALERRT).

Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT)

The ALERRT Center at Texas State University is one of the most widely accepted active attack programs in the nation. ALERRT was created at Texas State University in 2002 as a partnership between Texas State University, the San Marcos, Texas Police Department and Hays County, Texas. BY 2013, ALLERT at Texas State was named as the National Standard in Active Shooter Response Training by the FBI.

Since 2002, ALERRT has been awarded more than \$72 million in state and federal grant funding. The program has trained more than 130,000 law enforcement and fire personnel nationwide in force-on-force scenario-based training. The ALERRT program is also responsible for training over 200,000 in the Civilian Response to Active Shooter Events (CRASE) Avoid-Deny-Defend awareness program. Please note many schools in Arkansas have received CRASE training from the Arkansas Center for School Safety and local and county law enforcement personnel across the state.

The ALERRT program is data driven and research based. The staff uses in-depth after-action lessons learned through partnerships with agencies who have been involved in some of the most highly published events related to active shooter situations. ALERRT established a criminal justice research department to evaluate and enhance the overall understanding of active attack events and assist in improving best practices.

Numerous state and federal agencies have accepted the ALERRT curriculum as their standard active shooter training. These states include, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, Oklahoma, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Georgia and Virginia. In addition, the New York Police Department, San Antonio Police Department, Miami Police Department, Memphis Police Department and the Atlanta Police Department are some of the major cities to adopt ALERRT as their standard. (Information obtained from [the ALERRT website](#).)

Based on the Uvalde event as described in the Robb School Report, the ALERRT training program addresses most of the leadership and tactical failures identified.

The Level 1 basic course is the backbone of the law enforcement instruction and designed to prepare the law enforcement officer to isolate, distract and neutralize an active shooter. The course covers shooting and moving, threshold evaluation, concepts and principles on team movement, setting up for and conducting room entries, approach and breaching areas, improvised explosive devices, and post engagement priorities of work. The course utilizes force-on-force scenarios as proof of instruction concepts. If these principles had been used in the Robb Elementary School shooting incident the outcome may have been much different.

In 2018, ALERRT merged the three primary first responder disciplines (Police, Fire, and EMS), and developed an integrated response that includes emergency medicine,

coordinated command centers, stronger local, regional, state and national response preparedness and processes. With the addition of the integrated response system the ALERRT program is now a three-prong approach in providing active shooter event survival skills. They teach law enforcement the approach of stop the threat prior to anything else, they provide a civilian response course that teaches our civilian populace the skills to survive from the time the active attack starts until law enforcement officers neutralize the threat and the integrated response system that allows for immediate on-site lifesaving procedures.

Additionally, ALERRT provides specific training in the following areas:

1. **Active Shooter Incident Management:** The course provides an overview of the incident command systems and the specific way to use the processes to integrate various stakeholders in the first hour of response to an active attack.
2. **CRASE:** This training platform focuses on civilians and is frequently requested by schools, businesses and hospitals. The civilian response to active shooter events provides resources in how to act if they are confronted with an active shooter event.
3. **Civilian Response and Casualty Care:** This course combines the civilian response to an active shooter with the Stop the Bleed Campaign, which empowers civilians to provide life saving medical aid before first responders ever arrive.
4. **Breaching:** The training provides hands on training to aid the first responder in approaching and breaching crisis site using traditional and non-traditional methods. The class discusses manual and ballistic breaching tools to gain immediate entry into a structure under extreme circumstances that demand immediate entry to save and protect lives.
5. **Exterior Response to Active Shooters Events:** The course is designed to prepare law enforcement for an open-air active attack encounter. It addresses tactics and techniques to be used in an exterior environment with an armed aggressor.
6. **First Responder Medical:** This is a train the trainer course that delivers a Tactical Medical for Patrol Officers course of study. This is a critical component in immediate life saving measures.
7. **Solo Officer Rapid Deployment:** The course provides the solo officer with knowledge, skills and mind set on how to isolate, distract, or neutralize an armed threat like an active shooter.

ALERRT provides the most comprehensive instructional approach to the active attack event as any program in the nation. ALERRT is funded through the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Assistance and is the most widely accepted active shooter program in our region and on a national platform. The State of Arkansas currently has over 400 certified ALERRT trainers who can provide immediate instruction in the majority of the eight ALERRT platforms. Furthermore, ALERRT is the active shooter standard curriculum for Arkansas

Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training academies in NW and Central Arkansas and ALETA in Camden.

Recommendation 5: If a school district authorizes the use of the CSSO program, that policies, protocols, training, and selection go above the minimum standards required, to include standard psychological exams, random drug screening, extensive firearms handling training, and regular training with local law-enforcement.

The CSSO program was authorized legislatively through [Act 393](#) of 2015. We believe since the 2018 Commission's recommendation there has been a significant increase in the use of these programs. We are hopeful the latest survey will give us a much clearer picture. It will also let us know how many districts utilize enhanced requirements (such as psychological testing and random drug screening, etc.) that are above the Arkansas State Police (ASP) certification.

The ASP is the regulatory agency that manages the Commission School Security Officer (CSSO) program. The ASP require new CSSOs to complete 60 hours of training encompassing active shooter training, live fire training, medical, and weapon retention. The ASP requires CSSOs to receive 24 hours of annual training encompassing the same curriculum as required in the initial 60-hour training. A background check is required every other year because CSSOs are required to renew their credentials on a biannual basis. The survey will ask districts if they are psychologically testing their new CSSOs and if they are using random drug testing.

The subcommittee believes it is important for local law enforcement agencies to train with their public school and the school's CSSOs. We hope to gain a better understating through the survey, but based on anecdotal information it appears the CSSO program is being used by more districts every year. The subcommittee believes the Commission's CSSO model with enhanced requirements is an economical way of placing armed security within every school, in all of Arkansas's school districts and urges school leaders to consider a hybrid approach using CSSOs and SROs in order to provide every school with armed security redundancy.

Recommendation 6: Schools should consider strategies that layer and build redundancy for optimal security.

Much discussion has taken place as to the intent of this recommendation. Our subcommittee will likely recommend changing the word "consider" to "implement". We further believe, as it pertains to our mission, layering and redundancy are critical.

This recommendation is meant to stress the importance of designing into a district's plan for armed security, a method of insuring that, in the event the individual(s) providing armed security are absent, there is another person available to provide the armed security detail for the day. The original Commission's reason for Recommendation 6 was also to point out that, when possible, a school should have multiple people assigned to armed security on any given day. For our subcommittee, layering and redundancy speak to the critical need to

not only have armed, trained personnel (SROs and/or CSSOs) present in each building, but to have multiple in each building for “layering”. When utilizing SROs redundancy means having plans in place to have “substitutes” step in when they are absent, just like when a teacher calls in sick.

The subcommittee believes schools are best served with law enforcement providing security, but this may be a struggle to accomplish given the level of funding necessary to provide every school with a resource officer and the current retention and recruitment issues facing law enforcement agencies across the state.

We anticipate recommending additional training for CSSOs, primarily Active Shooter (similar to SROs). This serves two purposes. One, it provides for redundancy; two, it assists the responders in a psychological way. Knowing others on the scene are going to react consistently.

Recommendation 7: Arkansas’s Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training (CLEST) should study the feasibility of school districts being allowed to establish their own law enforcement agencies.

[Act 629](#) of the 2019 regular session gave school districts the ability to appoint an institutional law enforcement officer, thereby creating a school police department. Since that time, at least **16 school districts have developed their own police departments**. When the commission was gathering information to develop the 2018 report, Commission members heard from several school leaders that believed this model would best serve their districts. The 2022 Commission will use the 2022 School Safety Assessment to determine the number of districts that have since adopted this method of providing SROs for their schools. There have been several successful agencies thus far that have been established in larger school districts throughout the state.

The survey will determine how many (SROs and CSSOs) are furnished “Go Bag” and if so, what equipment is furnished. We anticipate recommending the Commission add this vital equipment as a recommendation to our overall report.

Audits, Emergency Operations Plans and Drills Subcommittee Report:

The Audits, Emergency Operations Plans and Drills Subcommittee has met weekly to discuss previous recommendations from the 2018 Arkansas School Safety Commission report. Below is a breakdown of those recommendations that include results from surveys and comments for possible future recommendations.

Recommendation 1: All districts should be required to form District Safety and Security Teams.

The 2019 School Safety Assessment results indicated that 2/3 of schools reported they had a District Safety and Security Team. While we applaud those schools that have formed these teams we have learned that some do not meet regularly. We believe that these teams, if staffed with appropriate personnel, and tasked with reviewing district Emergency Operations Plans and security policies and procedures, would help create a culture of compliance with security protocols.

We discussed an additional proposed recommendation/requirement for these teams to meet at a minimum of two (2) times a year to evaluate and update security policies and procedures. Districts need to ensure the routine evaluation of security procedures on each campus for: Perimeter doors closed and locked, classroom doors closed and locked, staff wearing ID badges, visitor logs/badges, and drills completed. Steve Vera with the Bentonville School District reported to the subcommittee that the results of his monthly security audits are part of the annual evaluation for principals. In addition, the District Safety and Security Teams should meet at least one (1) time a year with local emergency manager, fire and police to review their Emergency Operations Plans.

Recommendation 2: Each campus should also designate one current staff member as a School Safety Coordinator.

According to the Arkansas Center for School Safety (the Center), 97% of school districts have reported they have a School Safety Coordinator. We determined through discussions that many of the districts did not have one for each campus (i.e.: Elementary School, Middle School, Junior High School and High School). We believe there is some confusion regarding the Safety Coordinator duties/responsibilities and how they interact with the District Safety and Security Team. A question focusing on which campuses school safety coordinators are used was developed for the 2022 School Safety Assessment. The results of this assessment will be helpful in the modification of the 2018 recommendation or the development of a new recommendation(s).

The designated School Safety Coordinator on each campus should ensure compliance with security policies and procedures and be a member of the District Safety and Security Team. Thanks to a 2019 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) grant, the Criminal Justice Institute/the Center has been working with key stakeholders to develop the curriculum for a School Safety Coordinator Academy. This one-day, in-person, course will be available in the fall of

2022 and delivered regionally across the state. Topics to be included in the curriculum include emergency operations planning, school safety laws, incident command and best practices, compliance and accountability, responsibilities and coordination with local and county law enforcement as well as county fire and emergency managers.

Recommendation 3: The ADE's Safe Schools Committee membership should be expanded.

Completed. [Act 809](#) of 2019 was passed to expand the membership of DESE's Safe Schools Committee. This committee was initially formed following the shooting at Westside Middle School in 1998. In 2014, the Safe Schools Committee began to meet regularly, typically every two months. Dr. Cheryl May, Director of the Criminal Justice Institute has chaired this committee since 2014. The Safe Schools Committee is charged with the following responsibilities pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 6-15-1301(c):

- 1) To develop model policies and procedures that may ensure a safe and productive learning environment for students and school employees for recommendations to school districts. The procedures shall focus on ensuring the security of students and school employees and shall include techniques for prevention, intervention, and conflict resolution;
- 2) To recommend to the State Board of Education any necessary rules for ensuring a safe school environment; and
- 3) To recommend to the House Committee on Education and the Senate Committee on Education any necessary legislation for ensuring a safe school environment.

Act [809](#) of 2019 added the following positions to the Safe Schools Committee:

- Director of the Criminal Justice Institute or designee
- Director of the Arkansas Division of Emergency Management, or designee
- Director of the Arkansas Public School Resource Center, or designee
- Director of the Arkansas Rural Ed Association, or designee
- A Chief or a Sheriff
- Arkansas State Fire Marshall
- A school psychologist

Recommendation 4: Schools should modify their fire drills to include additional time for the teacher to evaluate the situation by looking, listening and observing prior to evacuating classrooms.

The 2019 School Safety Assessment showed that 72% of schools reported that they have modified fire drills to include time for teachers to evaluate the situation before evacuating classroom. This topic will be an element of the School Safety Coordinator Academy training being developed by CJI. The development of training for teachers is also being considered.

Recommendation 5: Comprehensive school safety assessments should be required to be conducted every three years and reviewed by the school board and school administration.

Acts [620](#) and [648](#) of 2021 requires all public school districts and open enrollment charter schools to conduct a comprehensive school safety audit every three years, with the first audit due by August 2024. It has come to the subcommittee's attention that there is confusion about the use of the terms "assessment" and "audit". Assessments are an overall evaluation of the safety and security of the campus/building. Audits, on the other hand, are conducted regularly (for example weekly or monthly) to evaluate whether safety and security policies are being followed. It should be noted that while the language used in Acts [620](#) and [648](#) is audit, in retrospect, the intent is an overall evaluation and therefore, the language should have been "assessment."

There are numerous free resources available to assist school districts in effectively completing the school safety assessment required in Acts [620](#) and [648](#). The U.S. Department of Education has developed and made available a FREE phone app, SITE ASSESS (<https://rems.ed.gov/SITEASSESS.aspx>). SITE ASSESS is easy to use and was designed specifically for K-12 schools. It also generates customized to-do-lists to address facility improvements. An additional advantage of this phone application is that once completed, the actual assessment will be saved and securely stored. Furthermore, the assessment can be customized to meet state or local requirements. For the past several years, the Arkansas Center for School Safety (the Center) has offered the course "School Site Safety Assessment and Audit Training". This 6-hour, in-person course focuses on the use of the FREE SITE ASSESS app and includes a walk through and physical evaluation of a school site using this app. To date, 173 participants representing 52 school districts have completed this course. The Center intends to increase the number of times this course is offered across the state. The SITE ASSESS app is also used by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to conduct site assessments of K-12 schools. During a presentation to the Full 2022 Commission, CISA representatives Chad Johnson and Mark Kirby discussed the FREE site safety assessment services they provide. A copy of the materials they provided to the 2022 Commission is included in Appendix G. The Subcommittee will be discussing customizing SITE ASSESS to meet the specific needs of Arkansas.

The subcommittee is also considering the recommendation that routine security audits should be conducted monthly on each school campus to ensure that all security procedures, like closed and locked doors, are being followed. The results of these audits should be considered to be a part of the administrator's annual evaluation. The Bentonville School District conducts monthly audits for all of their 23 campuses.

Recommendation 6: School nurses and staff should be trained in efforts that enhance the emergency medical response within schools.

Given the continuous rise in the number of opioid overdose deaths in the U.S. and Arkansas, in 2019, the Criminal Justice Institute (CJI) and the Arkansas Drug Director's Office partnered with the Arkansas Department of Education and the Arkansas School Nurses Association to provide naloxone training and naloxone kits to school nurses. To date, 675 school nurses representing 199 school districts have completed training and been provided with naloxone kits. CJI is currently working to replenish kits that have expired Narcan and train and provide naloxone kits to additional school nurses. These efforts are supported through a grant received from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.

Bleeding is the number 1 cause of preventable death. Act [245](#) of 2019 requires that each public school provide a bleeding control training as a component of a health course to be taught to students in grades nine through twelve (9-12). Thanks to the efforts of several individuals, especially Clayton Goddard, school staff have been trained and Stop the Bleed kits are now available in 160 school districts across the state.

To provide a better understanding of how many schools have the naloxone kits and Stop the Bleed kits readily available, a question was added to the 2022 School Safety Assessment. These data will be used to develop additional recommendations focused on the strategic placement of "stop the bleed" kits throughout each school.

Intelligence and Communications

Subcommittee Interim Report:

Recommendation 1: Each school district should support, establish, and maintain a comprehensive, common communication plan to be utilized by school officials, students, parents, law enforcement, and other stakeholders.

The subcommittee discovered that school districts across the state use a number of software and technology applications to communicate information to school officials, students and parents. School communication efforts with local law enforcement and other key stakeholders in the event of a critical incident is, unfortunately, unclear.

During our weekly subcommittee meetings, there were several discussions and presentations by subject matter experts that explained the processes being used in various districts to share information. Neither of the subject matter expert presentations presented a platform that delivered information directly to law enforcement. (Burton LRSD and Girdler ADE)

The subcommittee was not presented with a written example of a communication plan from any school district that could be used as a model or example to demonstrate how various schools are fully implementing this recommendation. The subcommittee members believe that the intent of the recommendation was to have a comprehensive communication plan that allowed for information to be shared to all the potential stakeholders. It appears that an effort has been made to communicate effectively with staff, students and parents but unclear the exact level or effort being made to communicate with law enforcement. To better gauge the types of systems being used by schools to communicate with local law enforcement, the subcommittee developed several questions for inclusion in the 2022 School Safety Assessment.

Recommendation 2: School districts should have systems that enable direct communication with local law enforcement.

Based on the 2019 School Safety Assessment, 70% of the school districts indicated they have a communication plan that allows instant communication with law enforcement. Examples of direct communication systems include, but are not limited to, emergency alert systems, radios for school officials that are programmed with law enforcement frequencies and/or school district camera systems that can be accessed in real time by law enforcement.

The subcommittee members spoke with a number of school district security personnel, (Hot Springs, Cutter Morning Star, Fountain Lake, Jessierville, Mountain Pine and Lakeside), to determine if they had direct communication with their law enforcement partners. Those that had an SRO assigned to the district stated that they utilized the SRO's radio for direct communication. Others stated that they did not have radio communication and gave responses for direct communication capabilities as being a cell phone or an application/software that sent an emergency alert via text message.

The subcommittee believes that the intent of the recommendation was that school personnel would have the capability to communicate effectively and directly with law enforcement during a critical incident. The committee also recognizes that in a critical incident the SRO may not be in a position to relay information between school staff and responding law enforcement personnel. This creates a need for communication capabilities beyond the single SRO radio. School administrators need access to direct lines of communication with law enforcement. This will allow pertinent information to be shared and once incident command is established it allows for better command and control across all fronts.

We also recognize that emergency alert systems may be sufficient in sending initial information of a developing event to local law enforcement personnel, but the need for direct radio communication is imperative in navigating a critical incident.

[Arkansas Code § 6-15-1302](#) allows for school districts to install communications equipment that is interoperable with the Arkansas Wireless Information Network (AWIN) system. We know that the Rogers Police Department and Rogers School District formed an alliance that allowed for communication between the two entities via the AWIN system. Director AJ Gary and Penny Rubow from the Arkansas Division of Emergency Management provided a presentation to the subcommittee concerning AWIN capacities and coverage limits. During that presentation we were informed that it is unknown how many school districts have this type of access, but the overall thought was the number was extremely low. The AWIN system has the capacity and coverage allowing for the largest portion of the State to utilize the program, but this does not seem to be the accepted path for communication for school districts. It is unclear if this is a cost issue or lack of knowledge.

Director Gary provided a follow-up presentation focusing on a possible statewide buildout of the AWIN system for use by the school districts. This would include the addition of numerous new towers across the state and use of bi-directional amplifiers inside school buildings to increase efficiency. The cost associated with the statewide buildout would exceed \$90,000,000.00 or \$207 per student. The cost estimate includes radios, towers, and bi-directional amplifiers for all school districts. The proposal and presentation were for informational and planning purposes only.

In order to obtain additional information, the subcommittee developed a survey question directly related to school district capabilities to communicate via radio with law enforcement. This question was incorporated into the 2022 School Safety Assessment. In addition, questions were developed to determine if the school district is using the AWIN system and if they are using radio communication with law enforcement other than on the AWIN system do those radios have AWIN capabilities. These data will help the subcommittee determine if the intent of the 2018 recommendation was achieved. In rural areas, the assumption of the subcommittee that state resources would respond to help coordinate the critical incident and the need to communicate on the AWIN system would be a huge benefit in the request and management of assets.

Recommendation 3: School districts, in collaboration with local and other law enforcement agencies, should implement and expand strategies to promote reporting, to include anonymous reporting, of suspicious activity/behavior and threats.

Referred to Mental Health Subcommittee

Recommendation 4: Students, staff, and parents should be educated on how to recognize and report signs of at-risk behavior and potential threats.

Referred to Mental Health Subcommittee

Recommendation 5: An analysis should be conducted to determine how the Arkansas State Fusion Center (ASFC) could be more effectively utilized to receive and disseminate information pertaining to threats against schools. In addition, the ASFC could provide timely and relevant information to schools and other appropriate entities pertaining to school safety.

The subcommittee recognizes that recommendation 5 has not been achieved, but work is being done to accomplish this goal. A presentation from the Arkansas Fusion Center discussed ongoing efforts to develop partnerships with various vendors to explore social media monitoring and how they can interact with local school districts from an intelligence standpoint.

In addition, we know that there is ongoing discussion on how to incorporate an ADE staff member into the fusion center organizational structure to ensure information sharing. There is also an effort to work more closely with Arkansas Center for School Safety to help disseminate critical information.

There is work to be done but progressive steps are being taken to improve intelligence gathering capabilities and information sharing among various stakeholders.

NEW POTENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS

(Additional Discussion and Information Needed Prior to Finalization)

- 1) School Districts should develop layered two-way communication access between staff members and administrative staff via various platforms to ensure information sharing and improve emergency alert processes. (Intercom systems, radios, cell phone applications, etc.)
- 2) Law enforcement should consider implementing proactive monitoring and intelligence gathering processes of potential active attack suspects by working closely with community stakeholders including firearm distributors, pawnshops or other community resources that could sell or possess materials and means to create mass casualties. (Farm supply stores, hardware's, or chemical sales)
- 3) Cybersecurity: The subcommittee heard presentations from Dr. Cheryl May (as Chair of the National Cybersecurity Preparedness Consortium) and Ray Girdler of the Arkansas Division of Elementary and Secondary Education. Both their presentations are included in Appendix G. Cybersecurity will be a major focus of the subcommittee going forward. Additional information and new recommendations focusing on enhancing the cybersecurity posture of our schools will be presented in the final report.

- 4) Law Enforcement and School Districts should develop capabilities to monitor social media outlets as it relates to threats or triggering phrases used by potential active attack suspects.
- 5) Recommendation for new radio systems that are being developed by law enforcement to consider the school district as part of their initial buildout and allow limited access to the law enforcement communication network for critical incidents by certain school administrators and staff.
- 6) Recommendation for districts to employ a social media monitoring system for district devices used by students.

Physical Security

Subcommittee Interim Report:

Recommendation 1: State agencies should work with the federal Readiness and Emergency Management (REMS) for Schools Center Training Assistance Office, to develop a customized, state-level school bus safety initiative for use by districts, schools, and transportation office.

This recommendation was not achieved. No initiative exists in REMS. The subcommittee recommends that the following new recommendation be proposed: An annual 3-hour mandated training is required for every bus driver in the state. Since this process is already in place an alternative recommendation would be to use 15-20 minutes of the 3 hours for bus security.

Recommendation 2: State leaders should engage the Arkansas congressional delegation and other federal partners to encourage the U.S. Department of Education to allow Title IV formula block grants to include use by schools for infrastructure improvements to support safe and healthy schools, including physical security remedies.

This recommendation was not achieved. There is a limited amount of funding for Title IV. Therefore, it didn't seem cost effective to pursue this option.

Federal funding is, however, available through the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) School Violence Prevention Program. This program is authorized under the Students, Teachers, and Officers Preventing (STOP) School Violence Act of 2018 (34 U.S.C. § 10551 et seq.). The COPS Office School Violence Prevention Program (SVPP) provides funding directly to states, units of local government, Indian tribes, and their public agencies to improve security at schools and on school grounds in the recipient's jurisdiction through evidence-based school safety programs. This grant does require a 25% match. However, waivers for the match amount can be requested.

There are also certain items (electronic door access, cameras, doors) eligible for districts to purchase with their ESSER funds (with proper ESSER justification: contact tracing).

Recommendation 3: Districts should create an online facility profile within a panic button alert system for each new campus or facility in the district and conduct annual reviews to update facility profiles where needed.

Status: This recommendation was achieved. Acts [620](#) and [648](#) of 2021 required a public school shall have a panic button alert system or other means of emergency communication with law enforcement if funding is available. Funding from state was made available for one year, but no funding has been available since. Dr. Cheryl May worked with the state Office of Procurement to establish guidelines for a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) for emergency response systems. ADE publishes a list annually of vendors who meet the RFQ for emergency alert systems. Per Acts [620](#) and [648](#) of 2021 schools are required to provide

current floor plans and pertinent emergency contact information to appropriate first responders and update annually.

Recommendation 4: Districts should review and assess the efficacy of upgrading any old style "crash bar" exterior door egress hardware with the newer "touch bar" type exit devices.

This recommendation has been partially achieved. Per the Division of Public School Academic Facilities and Transportation's (DPSAFT) facility manual "touch bar" type exit devices are now required on new construction. The 2019 School Safety Assessment, however, indicated that only 24% of districts indicated they reviewed and assessed the efficiency of upgrading old style "crash bars" exterior doors and updated to newer "touch bar" devices. School districts are strongly encouraged to upgrade to touch bar exit devices.

Recommendation 5: Prior to installation or contracting to installation of temporary door barricade devices designed to preclude intruders from entering any classroom or learning space of a school building, information pertaining to the project should be uploaded into the Division of Public School Academic Facilities and Transportation's (DPSAFT) web-based project submission tool for review.

This recommendation has been achieved. DPSAFT rules require districts to enter projects into master planning tool and require districts to submit drawings.

Recommendation 6: The state's Academic Facilities Partnership Program should be revised to allow districts to submit eligible campus safety and security upgrade projects for state financial assistance.

This recommendation has been achieved. Partnership Warm, Safe, and Dry Systems Replacement Facility Projects for Safety - Partnership Rules allow for project applications to be submitted to the Division for safety upgrades. "Eligible safety upgrades shall include original installations of the following: secure entrance vestibule, ballistic-rated glass/films, CCTV, Electronic Access controls on doors, intruder locksets, and may include reinforced hallways adjunct to student occupied areas, fully enclosed walkways between buildings, permanently installed screening technology, visitor management systems, hallway security/fire doors, and vehicle barriers." In two Partnership project cycles, 24 security project applications from 18 districts have been submitted at an approximate cost of \$24.1 million.

Recommendation 7: The Arkansas Public School Academic Facility Manual should be revised to provide specific safety and security measures for school districts to consider in the design and construction of new public school academic facilities.

This recommendation has been achieved. Arkansas School Facility Manual Security and Safety (Section 8000) - The Division of Public School Academic Facilities and Transportation now has a section in its facility manual for Security and Safety, which contains requirements and guidelines for new construction. Requirements include standards for Locking Systems /

Hardware, Access Control, Communication Systems, Site and Perimeter, Video Surveillance, and Building Systems.

**NEW POTENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS
(Best Practices) Being Considered**

- 1) All exterior doors to school buildings in state must remain closed and locked during school hours.
- 2) All schools in Arkansas must have a procedure in place to ensure every exterior door to school buildings remain closed and locked during school hours.
- 3) All classroom doors to school buildings in state must remain closed and locked during school hours.
- 4) All schools in Arkansas must have a procedure in place to ensure every classroom door remains closed and locked during school hours.
- 5) Legislature needs to modify language in 12-13-109. Currently it requires teachers to "keep all doors and exits unlocked during school hours". The recommendation is that the legislature change this law to require all exterior doors and classroom doors to be closed and locked during school hours. No person shall be impeded from building egress per the current Arkansas Fire Prevention Code and the ADA Standards for accessible design.
- 6) At a minimum install electronic access controls for high frequency use exterior doors.
- 7) District campuses equip classroom doors with locks so that doors can be locked from the inside, allow for access from outside for authorized personnel, and allow for egress per the current Arkansas Fire Prevention Code and the ADA standards for accessible design.
- 8) District campuses have one visitor point of entrance and if feasible a secured vestibule at main entrance.
- 9) Require district campuses to use a visitor management system.
- 10) District campuses have security cameras that are accessed by designated individuals including local law enforcement during a critical incident.
- 11) District campuses have a grand master key for all locks on the campus.
- 12) District provides grand master key(s) to local law enforcement for use during a critical incident.
- 13) Dedicate at least 20 minutes of Division of Public School Academic Facilities and Transportation's (DPSAFT) 3-hour required annual bus driver training to bus security.
- 14) Add physical security items to existing Division of Public School Academic Facilities and Transportation's (DPSAFT) Maintenance & Operations facility inspection checklist.
- 15) Require electronic access for all exterior and classroom doors in DPSAFT facility manual (Safety and Security Section 8000, for new construction only).

- 16) Anti-shatter resistant film at the campus building entrance.
- 17) DPSAFT needs to investigate the feasibility of modifying DPSAFT facility manual (Safety and Security Section 8000, for new construction only) to expand the requirement for anti-shatter resistant film to include all exterior windows, up to a minimum of 6 feet from floor (currently it is required at main entryway and reception areas).
- 18) On all district campus buildings have corresponding numbers on classroom interior and exterior surfaces (wall, door, or window) easily identifiable to first responders so that they can reference position of students and/or intruders.
- 19) District campuses have physical barriers such as bollards, landscaping, fencing, low walls, etc. at school entrances, especially main entrance.
- 20) District campuses use reinforced vision panels on classroom doors.
- 21) District campuses use covers on vision panels on classroom doors to be used during lockdowns that also allow students a blind area to 'hide'.
- 22) Any doors that have faulty locks must have a high priority work order entered immediately and the faulty locks must be repaired/replaced immediately.

Appendix A

STATE OF ARKANSAS
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

PROCLAMATION

EO 18-03

TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS COME – GREETINGS:

EXECUTIVE ORDER TO ESTABLISH THE ARKANSAS SCHOOL SAFETY COMMISSION

WHEREAS: The Governor has long held school safety as a priority, and he led a national study on school safety in 2012; and

WHEREAS: Recent events involving violence at schools around the country make it necessary for the issue of school safety to be addressed in a comprehensive manner in Arkansas; and

WHEREAS: Crime and violence remain issues in schools nationwide; and

WHEREAS: It is a matter of state importance to provide best practices regarding school safety to our local school districts; and

WHEREAS: Arkansans with backgrounds in education, mental health, and law enforcement possess the necessary expertise to propose and develop workable solutions to the issue of school safety;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, ASA HUTCHINSON, acting under the authority vested in me as Governor of the State of Arkansas, do hereby order the following:

- (1) There is hereby created the Arkansas School Safety Commission (the "Commission"), which shall advise the Governor and the Department of Education on school safety across Arkansas.
- (2) The Commission shall be composed of members appointed by the Governor and shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor. The chair of the committee shall be designated by the Governor. The Commission shall be composed of:
 - a) A representative of the Office of the Arkansas Attorney General;
 - b) The Director of the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management, or his or her designee;
 - c) A Public School Superintendent;
 - d) A Public School Teacher;
 - e) A Public School Counselor;
 - f) The Director of the Arkansas Division of Public School Academic Facilities and Transportation within the Arkansas Department of Education;
 - g) An advisor on school security from the Arkansas Department of Education;
 - h) A County Sheriff;
 - i) A former Federal law enforcement officer;
 - j) A Mental Health professional;
 - k) The Director of the Criminal Justice Institute;
 - l) The Director of the Arkansas Law Enforcement Training Academy or his or her designee; and
 - m) Additional citizens, as the Governor deems necessary, to represent the different geographic regions of Arkansas.
- (3) The members of the Commission shall have the following duties:
 - a) To advise the Governor and the Department of Education on school safety across Arkansas;

- b) Study and analyze the safety of K-12 schools throughout the state taking into consideration the physical and mental health of students;
 - c) To study the architecture and construction of school buildings as it relates to the safety of students and staff in those buildings, including prevention and response to active shooter threats;
 - d) Make recommendations to the Governor and the Department of Education on improvements or changes needed to increase school safety;
 - e) Consider any and all issues associated with school safety and should undertake school visits, visits with school resource officers, building principals, counselors, superintendents, and others to have a comprehensive view of this topic;
 - f) Consider assigning subcommittees with directions to consider several topics and report back to the full commission with recommendations to be considered;
 - g) The initial report and recommendation will be due to the Governor on July 1, 2018, with subsequent reports being submitted by the Chair of the Commission; and
 - h) The final report of the Commission's findings and recommendations shall be submitted to the Governor no later than November 30, 2018, at which time the work of the Commission will conclude.
- (4) Upon request, the Department of Education may provide staff and other personnel to support the work of the Commission.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Great Seal of the State of Arkansas to be affixed the 1st day of March, in the year of our Lord 2018.


Asa Hutchinson, Governor



Attest:


Mark Martin, Secretary Of State

Appendix B

2018 School Safety Commission Members

Dr. Cheryl May - Chair

Director, Criminal Justice Institute (CJI)
University of Arkansas System

William Temple - Vice Chair

Retired Special Agent in Charge,
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

John Kaminar

Security and Lost Prevention Manager
Arkansas Department of Education (ADE)

Brad Montgomery

Director of Public School Academic
Facilities and Transportation Arkansas
Department of Education (ADE)

A.J. Gary

Director, Arkansas Department of
Emergency Management (ADEM)

Tim Helder

Washington County Sheriff

Jami Cook

Director, Commission on Law Enforcement
Standards and Training (CLEST)

Will Jones

Deputy Attorney General
Special Investigations Unit

Dr. David Hopkins

Superintendent
Clarksville School District

Dawn Anderson

High School Counselor
Hot Springs High School

John Allison

Teacher
Vilonia High School

Tom Jenkins

Chief Rogers Fire Department

Marvin L. Burton

Deputy Superintendent
Little Rock School District

Lori Poston

Child and Adolescent Therapist from
Jonesboro

Dr. Margaret Weiss

MD, PHD, UAMS Professor Department of
Psychiatry, and Director of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry

Ricky Hopkins

Parent
Prescott School District

Dr. Sterling Claypoole

Professor in Psychology at South Arkansas
Community College and Parent of
Students in El Dorado School District

Dr. Joyce Cottoms

Superintendent
Marvell-Elaine School District

Appendix C

2018 School Safety Commission Recommendations

Mental Health and Prevention Subcommittee

- Recommendation 1: Every school district should conduct school climate surveys across all campuses, and develop and implement an action plan based on the findings of the school climate survey.
- Recommendation 2: All school districts should implement a positive climate program that deters bullying behaviors, and promotes social-emotional learning and positive peer relationships.
- Recommendation 3: All school districts should provide access to training in Youth Mental Health First Aid for all personnel who interact with students. Additional school personnel training may include: Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs), Trauma-Informed Schools, Drug-Endangered Children, and Social-Emotional Learning.
- Recommendation 4: All school districts should establish a behavioral threat assessment team and process.
- Recommendation 5: The Arkansas Department of Education should review roles and responsibilities of school counselors to provide increased time with students for provision of counseling and social-emotional learning, as well as referral to community resources as appropriate.
- Recommendation 6: A coordinated crisis response team should be developed to mitigate the emotional impact of any traumatic event that impacts a district.

Law Enforcement and Security Subcommittee

- Recommendation 1: No campus should ever be without an armed presence when staff and children are attending class or a major extra-curricular activity.
- Recommendation 2: If financially practicable, schools should ideally have at least one SRO for each campus.
- Recommendation 3: School districts should execute a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with their partnering law enforcement agency that identifies the roles and responsibilities of SROs and other critical elements.
- Recommendation 4: SROs whose primary assignment is within the schools should receive specialized training.

- Recommendation 5: If a school district authorizes the use of the CSSO program, that policies, protocols, training, and selection go above the minimum standards required, to include standard psychological exams, random drug screening, extensive firearms handling training, and regular training with law enforcement.
- Recommendation 6: Schools should consider strategies that layer and build redundancy for optimal security.
- Recommendation 7: Arkansas's Commission on Law Enforcement Standards and Training (CLEST) should study the feasibility of school districts being allowed to establish their own law enforcement agencies.

Audits, Emergency Operation Plans and Drills Subcommittee

- Recommendation 1: All districts should be required to form District Safety and Security Teams.
- Recommendation 2: Each campus should also designate one current staff member as a School Safety Coordinator.
- Recommendation 3: The ADE's Safe Schools Committee membership should be expanded.
- Recommendation 4: Schools should modify their fire drills to include additional time for the teacher to evaluate the situation by looking, listening and observing prior to evacuating their classrooms.
- Recommendation 5: Comprehensive school safety assessments should be required to be conducted every three years and reviewed by the school board and school administration.
- Recommendation 6: School nurses and staff should be trained in efforts that enhance the emergency medical response within schools.

Intelligence and Communications Subcommittee

- Recommendation 1: Each school district should support, establish, and maintain a comprehensive, common communication plan to be utilized by school officials, students, parents, law enforcement, and other stakeholders.
- Recommendation 2: School districts should have systems that enable direct communication with local law enforcement.

- Recommendation 3: School districts, in collaboration with local and other law enforcement agencies, should implement and expand strategies to promote reporting, to include anonymous reporting, of suspicious activity/behavior and threats.
- Recommendation 4: Students, staff, and parents should be educated on how to recognize and report signs of at-risk behavior and potential threats.
- Recommendation 5: An analysis should be conducted to determine how the Arkansas State Fusion Center (ASFC) could be more effectively utilized to receive and disseminate information pertaining to threats against schools. In addition, the ASFC could provide timely and relevant information to schools and other appropriate entities pertaining to school safety.

Physical Security Subcommittee

- Recommendation 1: State agencies should work with the federal Readiness and Emergency Management (REMS) for Schools Center Training Assistance Office, to develop a customized, state-level school bus safety initiative for use by districts, schools, and transportation offices.
- Recommendation 2: State leaders should engage the Arkansas congressional delegation and other federal partners to encourage the U.S. Department of Education to allow Title IV formula block grants to include use by schools for infrastructure improvements to support safe and healthy schools, including physical security remedies.
- Recommendation 3: Districts should create an online facility profile within a panic button alert system for each new campus or facility in the district and conduct annual reviews to update facility profiles where needed.
- Recommendation 4: Districts should review and assess the efficacy of upgrading any old style "crash bar" exterior door egress hardware with the newer "touch bar" type exit devices.
- Recommendation 5: Prior to installation or contracting to installation of temporary door barricade devices designed to preclude intruders from entering any classroom or learning space of a school building, information pertaining to the project should be uploaded into DPSAFT's web-based project submission tool for review.

- Recommendation 6: The state's Academic Facilities Partnership Program should be revised to allow districts to submit eligible campus safety and security upgrade projects for state financial assistance.

Appendix D

STATE OF ARKANSAS
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

PROCLAMATION

EO 22-09

TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS COME – GREETINGS:

EXECUTIVE ORDER TO RECONVENE THE ARKANSAS SCHOOL SAFETY COMMISSION

- WHEREAS: On March 1, 2018, pursuant to EO 18-03, Governor Hutchinson created the Arkansas School Safety Commission (the "Commission"), which advised the Governor and the Department of Education on school safety across Arkansas; and
- WHEREAS: The Commission provided a final report on November 30, 2018, which outlined findings and recommendations to improve school safety throughout the state; and
- WHEREAS: Schools across Arkansas have implemented many of the recommendations found in the Commission's Final Report, including but not limited to, conducting school climate and culture assessments, implementing positive climate programs, providing access to training in Youth Mental Health First Aid for personnel, ensuring that school districts have armed personnel present when staff and children are present, employing at least one School Resource Officer, forming District Safety and Security Teams, designating a staff member as a School Safety Coordinator, and many others; and
- WHEREAS: Crime and violence remain issues in schools nationwide; and
- WHEREAS: On May 24, 2022, an armed intruder entered Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, and murdered over 20 people, including 19 students aged 11 or under and two educators, and injured countless others; and
- WHEREAS: It is crucial that the state remain informed of the status of school safety and ensure that school districts are properly equipped to prevent tragic events such as the one that occurred in Uvalde; and
- WHEREAS: It is a matter of state importance to provide an updated analysis of best practices regarding school safety to our local school districts; and

NOW, THEREFORE, I, ASA HUTCHINSON, acting under the authority vested in me as Governor of the State of Arkansas, do hereby order the following:

- (1) There is hereby reconvened the Arkansas School Safety Commission (the "Commission"), which shall advise the Governor and the Department of Education on the status of school safety across Arkansas.
- (2) The Commission shall be composed of members appointed by the Governor and shall serve at the pleasure of the Governor. The chair of the committee shall be designated by the Governor. The Commission shall be composed of:
 - a) A representative of the Office of the Arkansas Attorney General;
 - b) The Director of the Division of Emergency Management within the Arkansas Department of Public Safety, or his or her designee;
 - c) A Public School Superintendent;
 - d) A Public School Teacher;
 - e) A Public School Counselor;
 - f) The Director of the Arkansas Division of Public School Academic Facilities and Transportation within the Arkansas Department of Education;
 - g) An advisor on school security from the Arkansas Department of Education;

- h) A County Sheriff;
- i) A former Federal Law Enforcement Officer;
- j) A Mental Health professional;
- k) The Director of the Criminal Justice Institute;
- l) The Director of the Arkansas Law Enforcement Training Academy, or his or her designee; and
- m) Additional citizens, as the Governor deems necessary, to represent the different geographic regions of Arkansas.

(3) The members of the Commission shall have the following duties:

- a) Review the Commission's Final Report published in November 2018;
- b) Provide an update on the status of school safety across Arkansas;
- c) Update the analysis of the safety of K-12 schools throughout the state, taking into consideration the physical and mental health of students;
- d) Determine which findings and recommendations from the previous report have not been remediated or achieved;
- e) Identify any new recommendations of best practices in school safety that have developed since the Commission's Final Report in November 2018;
- f) Submit an initial report and recommendations will be due to the Governor on August 1, 2022, with subsequent reports being submitted by the Chair of the Commission; and
- g) Submit the final report of the Commission's findings and recommendations to the Governor no later than October 1, 2022, at which time the work of the Commission will conclude.

(4) Upon request, the Department of Education may provide staff and other personnel to support the work of the Commission.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Great Seal of the State of Arkansas to be affixed the 10th day of June, in the year of our Lord 2022.



Attest:

John Thurston
John Thurston, Secretary of State

Asa Hutchinson
Asa Hutchinson, Governor

Appendix E

2022 Commission Members

Dr. Cheryl May – Chair

Director, Criminal Justice Institute
University of Arkansas System

Arkansas Attorney General

Leslie Rutledge

Arkansas Attorney General, or her
designee

A.J. Gary

Director, Division of Emergency
Management
Arkansas Department of Public Safety

Dr. David Hopkins

Superintendent,
Clarksville School District

Donna Wilchie

School Counselor,
Conway School District

Tim Cain

Director, Division of Public School
Academic Facilities and Transportation
Arkansas Department of Education

Crystal Braswell

Office of Coordinated Support and
Services, Division of Elementary and
Secondary Education
Arkansas Department of Education

Tim Helder

Sheriff, Washington County

Bill Temple

Retired Special Agent,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Dr. Laura Dunn

Director,
UAMS Psychiatric Research Institute

Secretary Jami Cook

Director, Arkansas Law Enforcement
Training Academy
Secretary, Arkansas Department of
Public Safety

John Allison

Teacher, Vilonia High School

Marvin Burton

Principal, Little Rock School District

Chris Chapmond

Chief, Hot Springs Police Department
President, Arkansas Association of
Chiefs of Police

Patricia Gann

Deputy Director, Division of Aging,
Adult, and Behavioral Health Services
Arkansas Department of Human
Services

Bill Gossage

Deputy Chief of Staff, External
Operations, Governor's Office

Linda Graham

School Psychologist,
Nettleton School District

Dr. Mike Hernandez

Executive Director, Arkansas
Association of Educational
Administrators

Bill Hollenbeck

Chief of Police, Fort Smith Public
Schools

Ricky Hopkins

Parent, Prescott School District

Tom Jenkins

Chief, Rogers Fire Department

Lori Poston

Vice President of Clinical Services,
Northeast Region, Arisa Health

Courtney Salas-Ford

Chief Legal Counsel, Division of
Elementary and Secondary Education
Arkansas Department of Education

Paula Stone

Assistant Director, Children's Services,
Division of Aging, Adult, and Behavioral
Health Services
Arkansas Department of Human
Services

Members assigned to each subcommittee

Mental Health and Prevention

Ms. Lori Poston-Chair
Dr. Cheryl May
Ms. Crystal Green-Braswell
Dr. Laura Dunn
Ms. Patricia Gann
Ms. Linda Graham
Ms. Paula Stone
Ms. Donna Wilchie

Audits, Emergency Operation Plans and Drills

Director A.J. Gary-Chair
Dr. Cheryl May
Chief Tom Jenkins
Dr. David Hopkins
Mr. John Allison
Dr. Mike Hernandez
Director Tim Cain

Law Enforcement and Security

Sheriff Tim Helder-Chair
Dr. Cheryl May
Mr. Bill Temple
Chief William Hollenbeck
Dr. David Hopkins
Chief Chris Chapmond
Mr. John Allison
Attorney General Leslie Rutledge

Intelligence and Communications

Chief Chris Chapmond-Chair
Secretary Jami Cook-Former Chair
Dr. Cheryl May
Director A.J. Gary
Mr. Bill Gossage
Attorney Courtney Salas-Ford
Ms. Patricia Gann
Mr. Marvin Burton
Mr. Joe Dubois
Mr. Bill Temple

Physical Securities

Director Tim Cain-Chair
Dr. Cheryl May
Ms. Donna Wilchie
Dr. Mike Hernandez
Mr. Ricky Hopkins
Chief William Hollenbeck
Sheriff Tim Helder

Subject Matter Experts

Mental Health

Dr. Nikki Edge

Dr. Betsy Kindall

Superintendent Scott Spainhour

Ms. Judy Littmar

Audits, Emergency Operation Plans

and Drills

Superintendent Jeff Cullum

Dr. Bethany Swindell

Assistant Chief Bubba Jones

SRO Phil Blaylock

Mr. Bo Robertson

Mr. Erik Wright

Intelligence and Communications

Mr. Ray Girdler

Dr. Angela Kremers

Dr. Erin Finzer

Law Enforcement

Assistant Chief Bubba Jones

Dr. Nancy Anderson

Physical Security

SRO Phil Blaylock

Mr. Ron Self

Mr. Clayton Vaden

Mr. Nathan Alderson

Mr. Tyrel Pace

Mr. Jason Black

Dr. Nancy Anderson

Appendix F

Non-Commission Member Presenters

Ms. Cindy Marble

Former Special Agent for the Secret Service

Topic: Behavioral Threat Assessment

June 28, 2022

Mr. Chad Johnston

Protective Security Advisor-Arkansas, Region VI, DHS/CISA
and

Mr. Mark Kirby

Cybersecurity State Coordinator-Arkansas, Region VI, DHS/CISA

**Topic: Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency (CISA) Security Programs**

July 5, 2022

Ms. Hope Worsham

Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief (ESSER) Director
Arkansas Department of Education

Topics: THRIVE AR and SmartData Dashboards

July 5, 2022

Mr. N'nambi Islam, Little Rock Southwest Magnet High School

Ms. Mary Emily Wrzensinski, Hamburg High School

Mr. Webb Storer, Jonesboro High School

Topic: Students' Perspective on School Safety

July 19, 2022

Commission Member Presenters

Dr. Cheryl May, Director

Criminal Justice Institute

Topic: 2018 Arkansas Recommendations (30)

June 14, 2022

Topic: Arkansas Center for School Safety

June 21, 2022


Sheriff Tim Helder, Washington County

Chief Chris Chapmond, Hot Springs Police Department/President, Arkansas Association of
Chiefs of Police

Topic: Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Uvalde Report

July 12, 2022

Appendix G



AR Center for School Safety

- CJJ Has a Long History of Providing School Safety Training and Resources for Arkansas
 - National School Safety Resource Center 2002
 - SRO and Educational Staff Training 2009 COPS
 - 2014 ADE Safe Schools Committee Reconvenes
 - Recommended Formation of the Arkansas Center for School Safety
- MOU Between CJJ and ADE 2017
- 2019 Base Funding for CJJ/ACSS from Governor Hutchinson and Legislators

2



AR Center for School Safety

- 2019 Received BJA Grant with Focus on Behavioral Threat Assessments and School Safety Coordinator Academy (BBTA, ABTA, Toolkit, Policy)
- 2021 Act 620 & 648 Identified as State School Safety Clearinghouse with Governor Appointed Advisory Board and included private schools
- School Safety Programs-Online
 - School Site Safety Assessment (3hrs)
 - Autism Spectrum Disorders (7hrs)
 - Basic Mental Health Awareness (1hr)
 - Identifying and Preventing Bullying (3hrs)
 - Active Killer Response for Educators (2hrs)
 - Intro to Behavioral Threat Assessment (1hr)

3



AR Center for School Safety

- School Safety Programs-Online
 - SRO Roles and Responsibilities (3hrs)
 - SRO Roles and Responsibilities for Admins (1hr)
 - Intro to Human Trafficking for Educators (2hrs)
 - Basic Mental Health Awareness for Educational Staff (1 hr)

4



AR Center for School Safety

● School Safety Programs-In Person

- Addressing and Preventing Adult Sexual Misconduct (7hrs)
- Advanced School Threat Assessment (7hrs)
- Suicide Prevention for Schools (6hrs)
- Basic Behavioral Threat Assessment (7hrs)
- Civilian Response to Active Shooter Events (4hrs)
- Expect Respect: Promoting Healthy Relationships (6hrs)
- Juvenile Takeover of Social Media (4hrs)
- Planning, conducting and Analyzing EOPs (7hrs)
- Resilience Strategies for Educators: Self Care and Peer Support (4hrs)

5



AR Center for School Safety

● School Safety Programs-In Person

- School Site Safety Assessments & Audits (6hrs)
- Solo Engagement Response to an Active Killer (18hrs)
- SRO Basic (40hrs)
- SRO II Intermediate (28hrs)
- SRO Refresher (16hrs)
- Standard Response Protocol (John Michael Keys-8hrs)
- Strategic Communications for Interacting with Juveniles (6hrs)
- The Bully, the Bullied and the Not so Innocent Bystander (6hrs)
- Understanding Juvenile Law (7hrs)
- Youth Mental Health First Aid (8hrs)

6



AR Center for School Safety

- 17th Annual AR Safe Schools Conference
 - July 18-20, 2022
 - ACSS
 - Arkansas Safe Schools Association
 - Governor's Office
 - Arkansas Division of Elementary and Secondary Ed
 - Arkansas Attorney General

7



AR Center for School Safety

- SRO Certificate Levels
 - Level I: Basic SRO
 - Level II: Intermediate SRO
 - Level III: Advanced SRO
 - Level IV: Senior SRO

8



AR Center for School Safety

● FY22 Numbers thru May 31st

- 3,609 Attendees (online and in-person)
- Partnership with the Morgan Nick Foundation
- Human Trafficking Awareness and Internet Safety
- 14,957 Students
- 602 School Staff



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AR Center for School Safety

WWW.ARSAFESCHOOLS.COM



10

AR Center for School Safety

Ms. Vicki French
501-570-8098
vefrench@cji.edu



11



National Cybersecurity Preparedness Consortium (NCPC)

July 11, 2022

DESE Summit
Dr. Cheryl May



Why is Cybersecurity in Schools Important

- In 2021, over 1,000 schools in the U.S. were affected by Ransomware incidents.
- Schools are perceived as having lots of money. Range of ransomware amounts were \$100,000 to \$40M
- Schools are ripe with a lot of personal information on students and parents
 - Identity Theft
 - Human Trafficking
 - Sextortion
 - It Is All About \$\$\$\$\$\$



Slide 2

Introduction of the National Cybersecurity Preparedness Consortium (NCPCC)

The NCPCC's mission:

- To help State, Local, Tribe and Territory (SLTT) governments establish viable and sustainable programs to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from cyber attacks
 - Public and Private Sectors
- To provide research-based, cybersecurity-related training, exercises and technical assistance to SLTT communities (everyone has a role).



Slide 3

Consortium Members


- National Cybersecurity Preparedness Consortium Members
 - Cyber Defense Initiative-CJI/UA System
 - Dr. Cheryl May, Consortium Chair
 - Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security-University of Texas-San Antonio
 - Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service-Texas A&M University System
 - Norwich University Applied Research Institutes, Norwich University
 - Center for Information Assurance, Univ. Memphis

National Cybersecurity Preparedness Consortium



Slide 4

NCPC Partners



- Five Universities Working Collaboratively with Lanes
- Trained 113,606 from 2002 – September 30, 2021
- 48 Total Courses (and growing)
 - 33 Certified Courses
 - 15 Courses in Development
- Received Federal Appropriations in 2021 and 2022
- All NCPC Courses are Available Free of Charge!!




Slide 5

Organized Around the CCSMM

The Community Cyber Security Maturity Model:

- Framework for cybersecurity preparedness
 - Focusing first on low and no cost solutions
- Everyone has a role in cybersecurity from the individual, organization, community, state and nation
- Addresses all aspects of cybersecurity
- Incorporates other frameworks such as the NIST CSF, NICE, CMMC, EMP and others
- Provides a roadmap to improve cybersecurity posture



Slide 6

NCPC History

- NCPC-FEMA Partnership
 - 2013 1st NCPC CTG Grant
 - Lead Institutions
 - CJI, UTSA, NUARI
 - Course Development and Delivery
 - Based on annual FEMA Objectives such as:
 - Investigating Cybercrime
 - Internet of Things based attacks
 - End-User Awareness
 - Securing Critical Infrastructure (CI) and SCADA
 - **All NCPC Courses are FEMA Certified/Continuously Updated!**
 - And ADA Compliant (508 Compliance)



National Cybersecurity Preparedness Consortium



Slide 7

NCPC Capabilities

FEMA State, Local, Tribes and Territories (SLTT) Training

- Awareness
- Coordination and Planning
- Cyber Incident Response and Recovery
- Infrastructure Technical Training
- Cyber Threat Information Sharing



Slide 8

NCPC Capabilities

SLTT Training

- Individuals/End users
- IT Security Personnel
- Leadership

All These Groups MUST Be Involved in Establishing Your Cybersecurity Posture!



Slide 9

Target Audience



Leadership/Management

Courses that are strategic to assist the organization/community to create and modify strategies and plans for long-term goals. Roles can be Chief officers, policy makers, risk managers, mid-level management.



Leadership/Management - 20 Courses

Slide 10

Leadership/Management - 20 Courses

Awareness

- **AWR-383 – Cybersecurity Risk Awareness for Officials and Senior Mgmt (Length – 4 hours)**

This is a non-technical course designed to develop awareness of cybersecurity risks for elected officials, appointed officials and other senior managers so that they are better informed to properly protect the jurisdiction/organization during a cybersecurity incident. It is designed to help officials and senior management work more effectively with their Information Technology (IT) departments to mitigate cyber threats.



Coordination and Planning

- **AWR-384 – Community Preparedness for Cyber Incidents (Length – 12 hours)**

Community Preparedness for Cyber Incidents is a two-day, non-technical course designed to provide organizations and communities with strategies and processes to increase cyber resilience. Participants will analyze cyber threats and initial and cascading impacts of cyber incidents, evaluate the process for developing a cyber preparedness program, examine the importance and challenges of cyber related information sharing and discover low to no-cost resources to help build cyber resilience.

Slide 11

Leadership/Management - 20 Courses



Cyber Threat Information Sharing

- **MGT-473 – Organizational Cybersecurity Information Sharing (Length – 16 hours)**

This course introduces fundamental cyber information sharing concepts that can be incorporated into a cybersecurity program for both inside and outside an agency or organization. It introduces the purpose and value of information sharing and how sharing can assist with cyber incident preparedness and response before, during and after a cyber incident occurs. It will identify types of shared cyber information; explore when to share information; and will explore attributes found when reporting cyber information.

Slide 12

Leadership/Management - 20 Courses

Cyber Incident Response & Recovery

- **AWR-366W – Developing a Cybersecurity Annex for Incident Response (Length – 6 hours)**

This online course addresses the need for a strategic-level "how to" of responding to and sharing information about cybersecurity incidents through the cyber annex vehicle. At the end of this course, participants should possess the fundamentals needed to design and develop a cyber annex for states, locals, tribes and/or territories (SLTTs). It addresses what the annex is, how it is used, who should participate in the design, implementation and execution.



Technical Training

- **AWR-418W – Cybersecurity Fundamentals (Length – 4 hours)**

Cybersecurity Fundamentals is an introductory level course designed for new and transitioning Information Technology professionals. Participants learn preferred network topologies and the uses of Intrusion Detection/Prevention systems; the use and maintenance of firewalls and anti-virus software; to recognize various types of network based attacks; to recognize social engineering attacks, both remote and in-person; and the importance of establishing policies, and disaster planning.

Slide 13

Target Audience



IT Security Personnel

- Courses that focus on developing skills needed to design, develop, implement and maintain cybersecurity. to protect themselves, their organizations and community's from data loss or cyber attacks. Roles can be IT, information security or cybersecurity professionals or those with technical responsibilities within the organization/community.



IT Security – 18 Courses

Slide 14

IT Security Personnel– 18 Courses

Awareness



- **AWR-388W – Cybersecurity Awareness for Municipal, Police, Fire and EMS IT Personnel (Length – 2 hours)**
This course covers basic cyber awareness for Municipal, Police, Fire and EMS Information Technology personnel. Participants will increase their knowledge of threats specific to their jurisdiction and an understanding of the processes and procedures needed to develop a cyber-awareness program. This course focuses on the steps involved in being aware of cyber threats and effectively communicating the processes and procedures to protect users against common cyber threats. The participants will apply this knowledge by developing processes and procedures to integrate cyber awareness into routine operations.

Slide 15

IT Security Personnel- 18 Courses

Technical Training

- **PER-256 – Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense (Length – 32 hours)**
Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense (CCD) is a basic-level course designed for technical personnel who monitor and protect our nation's critical cyber infrastructure. The course introduces students to cyber-defense tools that will assist them in monitoring their computer networks and implementing cybersecurity measures to prevent or greatly reduce the risk of a cyber-based attack. This course integrates hands-on computer lab applications to maximize the student's learning experience.
- **PER-257 – Cybersecurity First Responder (Length – 32 hours)**
Cybersecurity First Responder (CFR) is an intermediate-level course designed for technical personnel who are first responders to any type of cyber-based attack against our nation's critical cyber infrastructure. Blended learning methods are utilized, to include a balance of classroom lecture, hands-on laboratory exercises, and the use of cyberterrorism response tools against real world simulated cyber-attacks. Students learn the proper steps of an incident response to include incident assessment, detection and analysis, and the containing, eradicating, and recovering process from a system or network-based attack.



Slide 16

IT Security Personnel - 18 Courses

Technical Training

- **PER-382 – Malware Prevention, Discovery, and Recovery (Length – 32 hours)**

Malware Prevention, Discovery, and Recovery (MPDR) is an intermediate-level course designed for technical personnel who monitor and protect our nation's critical cyber infrastructure. Students learn how to recognize, identify, and analyze malware; the remediation process to eliminate the malware; and proper procedures to recover from the attack and regain network connectivity in a timely manner. This course integrates hands-on computer lab applications to maximize the student's learning experience.



Slide 17

IT Security Personnel- 18 Courses

Technical Training

- **PER-377 – Cybersecurity Proactive Defense (Length – 32 hours)**

Cybersecurity Proactive Defense (CPD) is an advanced-level course designed for technical personnel who monitor and protect our nation's critical cyber infrastructure. CPD uses hands-on computer lab applications to simulate advanced attack vectors, sequential and escalating attack steps, and hands-on attack execution. Students learn penetration testing skills, defense analysis techniques, and real-time response and threat mitigation steps.



Slide 18

Target Audiences



End User

- Courses that assist individuals to be in sync with the organization/communities cybersecurity to improve performance/effort/knowledge and change behaviors. Roles can be employees or individuals within an organization or community.

End User - 13 Courses

Slide 19

End User - 13 Courses

Awareness

- **AWR-367W – Understanding Social Engineering Attacks (Length – 8 hours)**

This course educates members of the public to understand some common defense tactics that can be used to mitigate social engineering attacks, this course provides students with an understanding of how social engineering attacks can be better mitigated by combining comprehensive security measures with an understanding and awareness of how such attacks can exploit human behaviors. Phishing, spear-phishing, water-holing, ransomware and other types of advanced persistent threats.



- **AWR-402W – Introduction of Internet of Things (IoT) Devices (Length – 2 hours)**

This course provides an understanding of the history, definitions and components that make up IoT. It addresses the different applications of IoT, as well as applicable laws and policies, technologies, emerging threats, best practices, security and a variety of existing and developing technologies. This course is ideal for participants, from throughout the various levels of government, private industry and community, wanting to understand how they are affected by IoT.


Slide 20

End User - 13 Courses

Awareness

- **AWR-397W – Cybersecurity for Everyone (Length – 4 hours)**

Computers, mobile devices and the Internet of Things (IoT) are a part of our daily lives. By using all of this technology, which makes our lives easier, we have opened ourselves up to the risks of cyber-attacks. This course will introduce you to the basics of protecting your computer and the data it stores as well as protecting yourself when you are online, on social media, and while using your mobile or smart devices.



Slide 21

End User - 13 Courses

Awareness


- **AWR-395W – Cybersecurity in the Workplace (Length – 2 hours)**

Every employee using a computer connected to the organization's network is a potential point of entry for a cyber-attack. For this reason, cybersecurity and protecting the organization's data/information is every employee's responsibility. This course will help students understand the different types of cyber-attacks their company may face, the type of information that is at risk, how to recognize cyber-attacks and why it is important for everyone in the organization to participate in cybersecurity.



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End User – 13 Courses



Technical Training


- **AWR-TBDW – End-User Security and Privacy (Length – 4 hours)**

This course will focus primarily on end-user's perspective. In particular, various security-related challenges faced by end-users and their impact on data privacy. The course will also include content concerning online content providers and local ISPs on access rights, unintentional data sharing, mobile apps and how to be compliant to a NIAP Protection Profile (PP), etc.

Slide 23

NCPC SLTT Experience

- Insights and statistics are taken into consideration for all courses
 - Observations
 - Interviews
 - Reports (Nationwide Cybersecurity Report – MSISC; National Preparedness Report; NASCIO Reports e.g.)
- Addresses
 - People, Capabilities, Resources
- Need a plan
 - Where to start (step by step)
 - No and low cost solutions



Slide 24

NCPC Establishing a National SLTT Program

FEMA SLTT Training

- Awareness
- Coordination and Planning
- Cyber Incident Response and Recovery
- Infrastructure Technical Training
- Cyber Threat Information Sharing

Other Capabilities

- Cybersecurity Exercises
 - Organization, Sector, Municipality & State
- Information Sharing
- Establishing Cybersecurity Programs
- Workforce Development
- Cybersecurity for Small Businesses
- K-16 Education
- Culture of Cybersecurity
- Rural Needs



Slide 25

NCPC SLTT Experience

- Key/Critical Actions
 - Back Up All Data
 - Ensure All Software Patches Are Updated Immediately
 - Ensure Passwords are Changed Frequently
 - Use Multi-Factor Authentication-MFA (VPN Capabilities)
 - Encryption
 - Cybersecurity Policies and Procedures are in Place
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Administration (CISA)
 - Know Your Vulnerabilities
 - Conduct FREE Vulnerability Assessments



Slide 26

Contacts

- WWW.NATIONALCPC.ORG
- Jimmy Nobles
Criminal Justice Institute
Cyber Defense Initiative
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jwnobles@cji.edu

National Cybersecurity Preparedness Consortium



Slide 27

Discussion & Questions: Thank You



Slide 28



2022

CYBERSECURITY
TRAINING
COURSES

Contents

3

About the NCPCC

4

NCPCC Experience

A snapshot of the NCPCC partners and where they've trained participants.

6

AWARENESS Courses

These courses provide a general awareness of various topics within cybersecurity.

11

COORDINATION & PLANNING Courses

These courses are ideal for organizations and communities preparing for physical and cyber threats.

13

CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE and RECOVERY Courses

Incident response teams, IT Personnel and any organization coordinating and/or managing cyber-related incident response and recovery will want to participate in these courses.

16

INFRASTRUCTURE TECHNICAL TRAINING Courses

Ranging from basic- to advanced-level, these courses help technical personnel protect network infrastructures from various cyber threats.

20

CYBER THREAT INFORMATION SHARING Courses

These courses are designed to help you establish an information sharing capability and become more familiar with the cyber threat information sharing ecosystem.

About the NCPC

The mission of the National Cybersecurity Preparedness Consortium (NCPC) is to provide research-based, cybersecurity-related training, exercises, and technical assistance to local jurisdictions, counties, states, tribes, territories and the private sector.


Using the Community Cyber Security Maturity Model (CCSMM) as a basis from which to work, the consortium collectively works with states and communities as they progress through the model.

The CCSMM is based on over a decade of experience with states and communities working to develop viable and sustainable cybersecurity programs for the whole community.

To register for NCPC web-based and instructor-led courses, contact your state's Homeland Security Training Office. More information on how to register for courses is on NationalCPC.org.



FEMA



By the Numbers

As of October 2021, members of the Consortium have trained more than 113,606 participants:

CIAS – 8,553 trained

CJI – 5,946 trained

CfIA – 5,052 trained

NU – 1,551 trained

TEEX/NERRTC – 92,504 trained



NCPC Experience

As early as 2004, in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the individual members of the NCPC have developed and delivered DHS/FEMA certified online and face-to-face **no cost** training courses to an array of states, counties, local jurisdictions, and critical infrastructure components nationwide addressing cybersecurity concerns.



NCPC Partners

Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security (CIAS) at the University of Texas, San Antonio | cias@utsa.edu

Criminal Justice Institute (CJI), University of Arkansas System | cji@cji.edu

Norwich University (NU) | norwichpro@norwich.edu

Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service/National Emergency Response and Recovery Training Center (TEEX/NERRTC) | bcs@teex.tamu.edu

University of Memphis, Center for Information Assurance (CfIA) | cfia@memphis.edu

Awareness



Cyber Ethics (AWR-174-W)

WEB-BASED. 13 hours; 1.3 CEUs;
2 hours - ACE; 2 semester hours.

This course shares the proper techniques for approaching the difficult ethical dilemmas arising from use of the modern Internet. Develop the skills to assess future ethical dilemmas by examining some of the more pressing concerns related to Internet usage today.



Cyber Security Awareness for Municipal, Police, Fire & EMS IT Personnel (AWR-388-W)

WEB-BASED. 2 hours; .2 CEUs.

This course provides participants with an increased knowledge of threats specific to their jurisdiction and an understanding of the processes and procedures needed to develop a cyber-awareness program. It focuses on the steps involved in being aware of cyber threats and effectively communicating the processes and procedures to protect users against common cyber threats.

LEGEND



Web-Based Course



Instructor-Led Course



Courses Under Development

COMING
SOON



Cybercrime Insight and Introduction to Digital Evidence Identification

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 8 hours.



COMING
SOON

A course that introduces state, local, tribal and territorial first responders with limited or no prior knowledge of computer crime and cyber investigations to the importance of identifying evidence related to suspected criminal activity, and incorporating evidence into investigation.



Cybersecurity Risk Awareness for Officials and Senior Management (AWR-383)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 4 hours; .4 CEUs.

This is a non-technical course designed to develop awareness of cybersecurity risks for elected officials, appointed officials and other senior managers so that they are better informed to properly protect the jurisdiction/organization during a cybersecurity incident. It is designed to help officials and senior management work more effectively with their Information Technology (IT) departments to mitigate cyber threats.



Cybersecurity for Everyone (AWR-397-W)

WEB-BASED. 4 hours; .4 CEUs.

This course introduces participants to the basics of protecting their computer and the data it stores, as well as how to protect themselves when online, on social media and while using a mobile or smart device.



Cybersecurity in the Workplace (AWR-395-W)

WEB-BASED. 2 hours; .2 CEUs.

This course helps participants understand the different types of cyber-attacks their company may face, the type of information that is at risk, how to recognize cyber-attacks and why it is important for everyone in the organization to participate in cybersecurity.



Detecting and Responding to a Cyber Attack (AWR-399-W)

WEB-BASED. 4 hours; .4 CEUs.

This course introduces students to various types of cyber-attacks and how to detect and respond to them in order to protect their data and information.

Awareness



Essentials of Community Cybersecurity (AWR-136)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 4 hours; .4 CEUs.

This discussion-based, non-technical course is an introduction to cybersecurity that provides individuals, community leaders and first responders with information on how cyber-attacks can impact, prevent and/or stop operations and emergency responses in a community. The course provides a cursory introduction to cybersecurity vulnerabilities, risks, threats, countermeasures and actions that communities can take to establish a cybersecurity program.



Foundations of Cyber Crimes (AWR-168-W)

WEB-BASED. 10 hours; 1.0 CEUs; 2 hours - ACE;
2 semester hours

This course examines cyber and cyber facilitated non-violent white-collar crimes, fraud and financial crimes, and violent crimes, and the appropriate response by first responders and other local, state and federal agencies that may encounter them. Participants will identify legislative, organizational and suggested personal efforts to control or prevent cyber crimes.



Introduction to Internet of Things (IoT) Devices (AWR-402-W)

WEB-BASED. 2 hours; .2 CEUs.

This course provides an understanding of the history, definitions and components that make up IoT. It addresses the different applications of IoT, as well as applicable laws and policies, technologies, emerging threats, best practices, security and a variety of existing and developing technologies. This course is ideal for participants, from throughout the various levels of government, private industry and community, wanting to understand how they are affected by IoT.



Mobile Device Security & Privacy (AWR-385-W)

WEB-BASED. 6.5 hours; .7 CEUs.

This course is designed to provide a better understanding of security and privacy issues associated with mobile devices and infrastructure; including benefits and challenges of designing, implementing and maintaining Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) Programs. Using scenarios, thought challenges and exercises as a framework, students will learn about the purpose of Enterprise Mobile Management platforms; elements that make mobile networks and operating systems different Mobile malware classifications and detection strategies; and mobile architecture data leakage detection and prevention strategies.



Network Security for Homes and Small Businesses

(AWR-396-W) WEB-BASED. 2 hours; .2 CEUs.

This course introduces students to the basics of networks for homes and small businesses, and provides them with best practices to secure their networks in order to protect their personal information as well as other information (e.g., friends, family, customers, vendors) that may flow through their network.



Demystifying Cyber Attacks (AWR-421)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 6 hours.



COMING
SOON

This course demonstrates tools used by bad actors and cyber defenders to provide a complete picture of a cyber-attack. This course is ideal for any individual responsible for responding to cyber incidents or organizational strategy.



Practical Internet of Things (IoT) Security

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 16 hours.



COMING
SOON

This course will introduce students to components of an IoT system and associated security concerns. It will cover the elements of an IoT system, including programmable logic controllers, sensors and network interfaces. Students will explore IoT vulnerabilities using common vulnerability assessment tools such as Kali Linux. Lecture and exercises will culminate in a laboratory experience where teams of students will build an IoT system and examine security considerations, vulnerabilities, and threats.



Remote/Home-Office Cybersecurity Preparedness (RHC) WEB-BASED. 4-6 hours.



This course addresses the changing workforce as a result from the COVID-19 Pandemic situation, opening the door for remote work environments that are changing the landscape of cybersecurity and Work From Home (WFH) strategies. The need for home office and normal work strategy/infrastructures is becoming tightly coupled, requiring using different cyber-enabled systems, devices, and services.



Understanding Social Engineering Attacks (AwR-367-W) WEB-BASED. 8 hours; .8 CEUs.

This course educates members of the public in the general understanding and some common defense tactics that can be used to mitigate social engineering attacks. It provides students with an understanding of how social engineering attacks can be better mitigated by combining comprehensive security measures with an understanding and awareness of how such attacks can exploit human behaviors. The course will introduce phishing, spear-phishing, water-holing, ransomware and other types of advanced persistent threats.



Understanding Targeted Cyber Attacks (AwR-376)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 8 hours; .8 CEUs.

This course provides specific information regarding targeted cyber attacks, including advanced persistent threats. This information will place participants in a better position to plan and prepare for, respond to and recover from targeted cyber attacks. This course will fill the gap in threat-specific training for cybersecurity as a community-driven course that focuses on the phases of targeted cyber attacks and the attacker methods used during each phase. Participants will also receive valuable information on cyber attack prevention, mitigation and response.

Coordination & Planning



Community Preparedness for Cyber Incidents (MGT-384)

INSTRUCTOR-LED.

12 hours; 1.2 CEUs.

This non-technical course is designed to provide organizations and communities with strategies and processes to increase cyber resilience. Participants will analyze cyber threats and initial and cascading impacts of cyber incidents, evaluate the process for developing a cyber preparedness program, examine the importance and challenges of cyber related information sharing and discover low to no-cost resources to help build cyber resilience.



Community Cyber Defense (an Interactive Exercise)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 8 hours.



COMING
SOON

This course will train students to establish community cybersecurity strategies to prevent, respond and recover from cyber-attacks. Participants will learn fundamental concepts of what's included in a cybersecurity program for organizations and the community.

COORDINATION & PLANNING
Courses >>

COORDINATION
& PLANNING

Coordination & Planning



Cybersecurity Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 16 hours.



COMING
SOON

Through learning to conduct cybersecurity vulnerability assessments and developing a vulnerability remediation program, organizations will be able to prepare and plan for cyber incidents.



Physical and Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure (MGT-452)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 8 hours; .8 CEUs.

This course encourages collaboration efforts among individuals and organizations responsible for both physical and cybersecurity toward development of integrated risk management strategies that lead to enhanced capabilities necessary for the protection of our nation's critical infrastructure. Participants will identify physical and cybersecurity concerns impacting overall infrastructure security posture, examine integrated physical and cybersecurity incidents and the evolving risks and impacts they pose to critical infrastructure.



Using the Community Cyber Security Maturity Model to Develop a Cyber Security Program

(AWR-353-W)

WEB-BASED. 2 hours; .2 CEUs.

This course will enable community leaders, network/security personnel and those individuals involved in developing or maintaining plans used for and throughout the community. It will help participants understand what is required to develop a coordinated, sustained and viable community cybersecurity program. Participants will also be introduced to various resources, including the DHS-supported Community Cyber Security Maturity Model (CCSMM), to guide communities and states in developing their own cybersecurity programs.

Cyber Incident Response & Recovery



Cyber Incident Analysis and Response (AWR-169-W)

WEB-BASED. 10 hours; 1.0 CEUs;
2 hours - ACE; 1 semester hour.

This course provides practical guidelines on responding to incidents effectively and efficiently as part of an incident response program. Primary topics include detecting, analyzing, prioritizing and handling cyber incidents. Real-world examples and scenarios to help provide knowledge, understanding and capacity for effective cyber incident analysis and response.



Cybersecurity Incident Response for IT Personnel (PER-371)

INSTRUCTOR-LED.

24 hours; 2.4 CEUs.

This course is designed to address the gap in specific technical skills needed for an effective cyber response. This course will also help improve the limited availability of targeted hands-on IT and security training focused on cyber-attacks. This training focuses on government and private sector technical personnel who have intermediate and advanced knowledge of network operations and/or the responsibility for network security.

CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE
& RECOVERY Courses >>

CYBER INCIDENT
RESPONSE/RECOVERY

Cyber Incident Response & Recovery



Developing a Cyber Security Annex for Incident Response (AWR-366-W)

WEB-BASED. 6 hours; .6 CEUs.

This course addresses the need for a strategic-level “how to” of responding to and sharing information about cybersecurity incidents through the cyber annex vehicle. At the end of this course, participants should possess the fundamentals needed to design and develop a cyber annex for states, locals, tribes and/or territories (SLTTs). It addresses what the annex is, how it is used, and who should participate in the design, implementation and execution.



Disaster Recovery for Information Systems (AWR-176-W)

WEB-BASED. 10 hours; 1.0 CEUs; 2 hours - ACE;
1 semester hour.

This course trains business managers to respond to varying threats that might impact their organization’s access to information. The course provides requisite background theory and recommended best practices needed by managers to keep their offices running during incidents of different types. Topics include disaster recovery planning; guides for implementing and managing disaster recovery plans; a discussion of technical vulnerabilities; and an examination of legal issues.



Incident Response for Municipal, Police, Fire & EMS IT Personnel (AWR-389-W)

WEB-BASED. 2 hours; .2 CEUs.

The course introduces the basics of the incident response process to the Information Technology personnel in Police, Fire or EMS departments. The content of the course will include: cyber incidents in Police, Fire, EMS and IT departments, and developing a response plan to cyber incidents.



Integration of Cybersecurity Personnel into the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) for Cyber Incidents (MGT-456)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 24 hours; 2.4 CEUs.

The course is designed to assist jurisdictions with coordinating and managing response efforts between emergency response organizations and critical infrastructure cybersecurity personnel. The course will help to ensure that traditional emergency management personnel and cybersecurity personnel recognize the importance of working together to mitigate the effects of a cyber incident. This course utilizes the Emergency Management Exercise System (EM*ES) incident simulation software.



Recovering from Cybersecurity Incidents (MGT-465)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 16 hours; 1.6 CEUs.

This course provides guidance to a jurisdiction on the actions necessary to effectively recover from a cybersecurity attack. It discusses the pre- and post-incident programmatic activities needed for short-term and long-term recovery, and bridges the different worlds of information technology and emergency management. This training is particularly pertinent to IT management, emergency management personnel, as well as any other government, critical infrastructure, or private sector personnel who has the responsibility for recovering after a cyber incident.



Network Traffic Analysis

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 24 hours.



**COMING
SOON**

This course will train students to conduct traffic analysis on their internal networks by doing a “deep-dive” into network traffic analysis using Wireshark and other tools to identify regular and anomalous network traffic. It will teach techniques necessary to identify network attacks by context and type.

Infrastructure Technical Training



Comprehensive Cybersecurity Defense (PER-256)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 32 hours.

A basic-level course designed for technical personnel who monitor and protect our nation's critical cyber infrastructure. The course introduces students to cyber-defense tools that will assist in monitoring their computer networks and implementing cybersecurity measures to prevent or greatly reduce the risk of a cyber-based attack. This course integrates hands-on computer lab applications to maximize the student's learning experience.



Cyber Identity and Authentication (AWR-384-W)

WEB-BASED. 6 hours; .6 CEUs.

This course addresses different forms of authentication, such as two-factor, multi-factor and other protections addressing identity compromise. Designed for public and private personnel at all levels of government, law enforcement, the private sector and other stakeholders, CIAA provides a broad-base of knowledge connecting the underlying concepts of digital identity to how people, devices and systems are authorized to access digital resources and services.



Cybersecurity First Responder (PER-257)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 32 hours.

An intermediate-level course designed for technical personnel who are first responders to any type of cyber-based attack. Blended learning methods are used to include a balance of classroom lecture, hands-on laboratory exercises and the use of response tools against real world simulated cyber-attacks. Students learn the steps of an incident response to include incident assessment, detection and analysis, and containing, eradicating, and recovering processes from a system or network-based attack.



Cybersecurity Fundamentals (AWR-418-W)

WEB-BASED. 4 hours.



An introductory level course for new and transitioning Information Technology professionals. Learn preferred network topologies and the uses of Intrusion Detection/Prevention systems; the use and maintenance of firewalls and anti-virus software; to recognize various types of network-based attacks; to recognize social engineering attacks; and the importance of establishing policies, and disaster planning.



Cybersecurity Proactive Defense (PER-377)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 32 hours.

An advanced-level course for technical personnel who monitor and protect critical cyber infrastructure. It uses hands-on computer lab applications to simulate advanced attack vectors, sequential and escalating attack steps, and attack execution. Learn penetration testing skills, defense analysis techniques, and real-time response and threat mitigation steps.



Cybersecurity Resiliency in Industrial Control Systems (PER-398)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 8 hours.

This course will review the Internet of Things vulnerabilities within Operational Technology and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems, methods of detecting and responding to cyber attacks in the systems, and actions that can be taken by non-technical personnel to mitigate or minimize the effects of cyber attacks.

Infrastructure Technical Training



Digital Forensics Basics (AWR-139-W)

WEB-BASED. 7 hours; .7 CEUs; 2 hours - ACE; 1 semester hour.

This course explains investigative methods and standards for the acquisition, extraction, preservation, analysis, and deposition of digital evidence from storage devices. Using realistic forensics situations, learn how to find traces of illegal or illicit activities using computer forensics tools and manual techniques. Also, learn how to recover data intentionally hidden or encrypted by perpetrators.



End-User Security and Privacy

WEB-BASED. 4-5 hours.



This course will focus primarily on end-user's perspective. In particular, various security-related challenges faced by end-users and their impact on data privacy. The course will also include content concerning online content providers and local ISPs on access rights, unintentional data sharing, mobile apps and how to be compliant to a NIAP Protection Profile (PP), etc.



Examining Advanced Persistent Threats (AWR-403-W)

WEB-BASED. 4 hours; .4 CEUs.

This course will address best practices that can assist in protecting against advanced persistent threats. Designed for public and private personnel at all levels of government, law enforcement, the private sector and other stakeholders, it provides a broad base of knowledge focused on how to prepare for, respond to and recover from the impacts of advanced cyber-attacks that exploit targeted victims.



Information Risk Management (AWR-177-W)

WEB-BASED. 13 hours; 1.3 CEUs; 2 hours - ACE; 1 semester hour.

This course addresses topics related to information assets, identifying risks, and management processes. Receive training on information risk-related tools and technologies for better understanding of potential threats and vulnerabilities in online business. Learn best practices and how to apply levels of security measures.



Information Security Basics (AWR-173-W)

WEB-BASED. 13 hrs; 1.3 CEUs; 2 hrs - ACE; 1 semester hour.

This course provides entry/mid-level IT staff a technical overview of information security, focusing on the knowledge to identify and stop various cyber threats. General concepts and topics covered include TCP/IP protocol, introductory network security, introductory operating system security, and basic cryptography.



Introduction to Basic Vulnerability Assessment Skills (AWR-368-W)

WEB-BASED. 7.5 hours; .8 CEUs.

This course helps prepare learners for the technical challenges associated with conducting vulnerability assessments and/or penetration testing. It introduces the basic skills needed to begin mastering in order to conduct or manage vulnerability assessments. It also introduces, Metasploit, which red teams use to test networks.



Malware Prevention, Discovery and Recovery (PER-382)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 32 hours.

An intermediate-level course designed for technical personnel who monitor and protect critical cyber infrastructure. Learn how to recognize, identify, and analyze malware; the remediation process to eliminate the malware; and proper procedures to recover from the attack and regain network connectivity.



Network Assurance (AWR-138-W)

WEB-BASED. 5 hours; .5 CEUs; 2 hours - ACE; 1 semester hour.

This course covers secure network practices to protect networked systems against attacks and exploits. Topics include authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA), as well as firewalls, intrusion detection/prevention, common cryptographic ciphers, server and client security, and secure policy generation.



Secure Software (AWR-178-W)

WEB-BASED. 9 hours; 0.9 CEUs; 1 semester hour.

This course teaches programming practices used to secure applications against attacks and exploits. Fundamental concepts and topics covered include secure software development, defensive programming techniques, secure design and testing, and secure development methodologies.

Cyber Threat Information Sharing



Community Cybersecurity Information Sharing Integration (MGT-478)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 16 hours.

This course will show SLTTs how to integrate cybersecurity information sharing into their community programs. Learn to strategically design and implement a cybersecurity information sharing program for the state, territory, tribe, jurisdiction, or region. This includes governance; creating public/private partnerships; and coordinating efforts to prevent, mitigate and counter attacks for a community.



Cyber Threat Intelligence INSTRUCTOR-LED. 16 hours.



COMING
SOON

This course introduces the information analysis process and how an organization can use it to identify, define and mitigate cybersecurity threats. Participants will gain a general understanding of the tools and processes needed for an analysis team to create cybersecurity information and intelligence within their organization. It establishes a framework for an analytical process; how shared analysis can provide actionable information, reduce uncertainty and reduce risk to enable decision makers.



Establishing an Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (AWR-381-W)

WEB-BASED. 8 hours; .8 CEUs.

This course will assist communities to establish an Information Sharing and Analysis Organization (ISAO). The course will introduce the value proposition of creating an ISAO and provide considerations to joining an existing ISAO. It will closely follow the guidance provided by the ISAO Standards Organization (ISAO SO), whose mission is to “improve the nation’s cybersecurity posture by identifying standards and guidelines for robust and effective information sharing and analysis related to cybersecurity risks, incidents, and best practices”.



Introduction to ISAOs (AWR-398-W)

WEB-BASED. 2 hours; .2 CEUs.

This course is designed to introduce the basics of the cybersecurity information sharing processes. Participants will have an increased knowledge of cyber security information sharing and an understanding of the steps taken to join or establish an ISAO/ISAC.



Organizational Cybersecurity Information Sharing (MGT-473)

INSTRUCTOR-LED. 16 hours.

This course introduces fundamental cyber information sharing concepts that can be incorporated into a cybersecurity program for both inside and outside an agency or organization. It introduces the purpose and value of information sharing and how sharing can assist with cyber incident preparedness and response before, during and after a cyber incident occurs.

“Our cyber infrastructure is every bit as important as our roads and bridges. It’s important to our economy. It’s important to protecting human life, and we need to make sure we have a modern and resilient cyber infrastructure.”

*~ Rep. Jim Langevin,
Co-Chair of the Congressional
Cybersecurity Caucus*



Thank you for your interest in the National Cybersecurity Preparedness Consortium (NCPC) courses. These courses are developed by the NCPC partners with funding from the Department of Homeland Security/FEMA and are offered at no cost to States, Locals, Territories and Tribes.

To register for NCPC web-based and instructor-led courses, contact your state’s Homeland Security Training Office. More information on how to register for courses is available on NationalCPC.org.



DHS/CISA Protective Security Programs

<https://www.cisa.gov/infrastructure-security>

Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments:

<https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-vulnerability-assessments>

These voluntary, nonregulatory and no cost assessments are a foundational element of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan's risk-based implementation of protective programs designed to prevent, deter, and mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack while enabling timely, efficient response and restoration in an all-hazards, post-event situation. Types of Assessments Offered are below:

- Security Assessment at First Entry: A more consolidated assessment that provide a shorter executive level report that can be provided a few days after the on-site assessment. Duration is around 1-2 hours.
- Infrastructure Survey Tool: A comprehensive physical security, continuity and emergency management focused assessment that provide a more detailed assessment report with a planning dashboard. Duration is around 4-6 hours.
- Multi-Asset and System Assessment: A comprehensive assessment process that provides risk and criticality analysis on a individual infrastructure system and provides interactive risk reduction solutions. Duration is 3-6 months.
- Infrastructure Visualization Platform: We create a virtualized platform of a facility (like a virtual tour) that can be used for a more interactive Table-top exercises or discussion-based drills focused on physical security threats.
 - <https://share.dhs.gov/pwqobrcia96j/>
 - Passcode: 04302021

Infrastructure Dependency and Interdependency All-Hazard Planning:

<https://www.cisa.gov/idp>

This tool is a supplement to the Infrastructure Resilience Planning Framework and is intended to help state, local and private sector planners better understand how infrastructure dependencies can impact risk and resilience in their community and incorporate that knowledge into all-hazard planning activities. CISA field staff will also provide on-site assessments to help support dependency and interdependency planning as requested at no-cost.

Emergency Services Sector Continuity Planning Support:

<https://www.cisa.gov/emergency-services-sector-continuity-planning-suite>

State/Local Government and First responders can leverage these resources through the CISA field staff to help evaluate and improve their continuity capability and enhance their preparedness for emergencies. Services are at no cost.

Securing Public Gathering Programs:

<https://www.cisa.gov/securing-public-gatherings>

To help organizations mitigate potential risks in today's dynamic and rapidly evolving threat environment, CISA provides a compendium of resources for securing public gatherings. These resources cover the numerous threat vectors in CISA's portfolio, including unauthorized access to facilities, cybersecurity, election security, active shooters, bombings, and small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS).

- **Businesses and Critical Infrastructure:** CISA provides businesses and critical infrastructure partners with resources to identify, develop, and implement scalable security measures to build or improve capabilities across the private and public sectors.
- **SLTT Authorities, Government and First Responders:** These resources provide information to help first responders, and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments protect themselves from a variety of CISA-identified threats.
- **Schools:** CISA, along with other organizations throughout government, law enforcement, and communities nationwide, is postured to continually enhance school safety and security.
- **Houses of Worship:** This resource page is designed to guide houses of worship through building improved security and safety protocols for their specific organization's congregants and facilities.

Active Shooter Preparedness:

<https://www.cisa.gov/active-shooter-preparedness>

DHS aims to enhance preparedness through a "whole community" approach by providing products, tools, and resources to help you prepare for and respond to an active shooter incident. We do a 1-2 hour on-site active shooter preparedness training workshop and conduct a active shooter security specific walk-through as a part of the workshop. On-site outreach resources are available to critical infrastructure stakeholders at no cost.

Insider Threat Mitigation:

<https://www.cisa.gov/insider-threat-mitigation>

The information and resources available from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) will help individuals, organizations, and communities create or improve an existing insider threat mitigation program. The key steps to mitigate insider threat are Define, Detect and Identify, Assess, and Manage. On-site outreach resources are available to critical infrastructure stakeholders at no cost.

Improvised Explosive Device Awareness Training:

<https://www.cisa.gov/office-bombing-prevention-obp>

The Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) leads the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement the National Policy for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (National Counter-IED policy) and enhance the nation's ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and mitigate the use of explosives against critical infrastructure; the private sector; and federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial entities. There are monthly virtual IED training opportunities that I will start sharing with you as well. On-site outreach resources are available to critical infrastructure stakeholders at no cost.

Critical Infrastructure Security Exercises:

<https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-exercises>

CISA has several types of exercise packages from discussion-based to table-top exercises. The CISA Table-Top Exercise Packages (CTEPs) serve as an off-the-shelf solution for a variety of exercise needs. We can be resources for supporting any of these exercises as needed.

Cybersecurity and Physical Security Convergence

<https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-and-physical-security-convergence>

The adoption and integration of Internet of Things (IoT) and Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices has led to an increasingly interconnected mesh of cyber-physical systems (CPS), which expands the attack surface and blurs the once clear functions of cybersecurity and physical security.



Simple Steps for Real Threats

Ray Girdler

DESE Director of Data Use & Privacy

ray.girdler@ade.arkansas.gov

Why are we here?

IT



Who is responsible for cybersecurity?

technology



people



vendors



Cybersecurity is not just an IT issue.

technology



people



vendors



Technology alone would only address
26% of the security vulnerabilities.

technology



people



vendors



Approximately **95%** of cybersecurity breaches are due to human error.

technology



people



vendors



At least **75%** of all data breach incidents involved district vendors and other partners.


technology



people



vendors



We need to change our thinking about cybersecurity!



***SECURITY
CHECKPOINT***

How frequently does your district provide **data privacy** or **security** training?



Students choose an option

Pear Deck Interactive Slide
Do not remove this bar

To your knowledge, has your district ever completed a **risk assessment** or **data inventory**?



Students choose an option

Pear Deck Interactive Slide
Do not remove this bar

To your knowledge, has your district ever conducted a **phishing test**?



Students choose an option

Pear Deck Interactive Slide
Do not remove this bar

Employees in my district know how to identify and report **data incidents.**



Students choose an option

Pear Deck Interactive Slide
Do not remove this bar

There are people in my district who have their **usernames** and **passwords** in plain sight.



Students choose an option

Pear Deck Interactive Slide
Do not remove this bar

There are people in my district who share their **usernames** and **passwords** with others.



Students choose an option

Pear Deck Interactive Slide
Do not remove this bar

Have you ever received notification that your personal information was **compromised**?



Students choose an option

Pear Deck Interactive Slide
Do not remove this bar

Has your district ever been part of a **data incident** that compromised student or staff records?



Students choose an option

Pear Deck Interactive Slide
Do not remove this bar

How many **data incidents** do you think went unreported in your district last year?



Students choose an option

Pear Deck Interactive Slide
Do not remove this bar

**I'M
HERE TO
HELP!**






Security Awareness

Security is not just an IT issue

<https://k12cybersecure.com/map>



2 in 5

have indicated
lost or stolen data.

21

that is

110 of 276

AR school districts.

22

that is possibly

190,000

AR student records.

23


which is

22 times


the incidents being **publicly**
reported.

24


How would this map look with x 22 incidents?



How would AR look with x 22 incidents?



At 22 times AR would have 110 incidents



post-pandemic

- + attempts have increased 6 fold +
- + num. of devices increased exponentially +
- + connectivity increased exponentially +
- + data transfers increased exponentially +
- + num. of vendors increased exponentially +

Robb Elementary School Attack Response Assessment and Recommendations



ALERT
TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY

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The following abbreviations are used throughout the report.

ISS – Internal School Surveillance
FH – Funeral Home video footage
OS – Officer Statement
IOI – Investigating Officer Interview
BWC – Body Worn Camera
UPD CS – Uvalde Police Department Call Sheet
RL – Radio Logs
UCISD PD – Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department
UPD – Uvalde Police Department
DPS – Texas Department of Public Safety
BP – Border Patrol
BORTAC – Border Patrol Tactical Teams

This report was created using school video, third party video exterior of school, body cameras, radio logs, verbal testimony of officers on scene, and verbal statements from investigators. This report should not be considered a definitive or final report as all investigatory options have not been exhausted at this point. This report should be considered a living document. It is subject to changes as new or further evidence becomes available. This report is being compiled for the explicit purpose of identifying training gaps to be addressed by police officers across the state of Texas. The authors of this report are subject matter experts in their field of active attack incidents, patrol, and tactical operations with over 150 years of combined experience. These are the expert opinions based on experience, research, and studies of other incidents and not a formal accusation of the responders on this incident.

Introduction

Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas was attacked on May 24, 2022. The attack resulted in 21 fatalities (19 students and 2 teachers) and 17 injuries. The Texas Department of Public Safety contacted the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center soon after the attack to assess the law enforcement response. The ALERRT Center was selected for this task for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, ALERRT is nationally recognized as the preeminent active shooter / attack response training provider in the nation. ALERRT was recognized as the national standard in active shooter response training by the FBI in 2013. ALERRT's excellence in training was recognized in 2016 with a Congressional Achievement Award.

More than 200,000 state, local, and tribal first responders (over 140,000 law enforcement) from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories have received ALERRT training over the last 20 years. The ALERRT course catalog includes several courses designed to prepare first responders to 1) isolate, distract, and neutralize an active shooter, 2) approach and breach a crisis site using traditional and non-traditional methods, 3) incorporate effective command to manage a rapidly evolving active situation, and 4) manage traumatically injured patients to improve survivability. ALERRT's curriculum is developed and maintained by a team of subject matter experts with over 150 years combined law enforcement, fire, and tactical experience.

ALERRT training is research based. The ALERRT research team not only evaluates the efficacy of specific response tactics (Blair & Martaindale, 2014; Blair & Martaindale, 2017; Blair, Martaindale, & Nichols, 2014; Blair, Martaindale, & Sandel, 2019; Blair, Nichols, Burns, & Curnutt, 2013;) but also has a long, established history of evaluating the outcomes of active shooter events to inform training (Martaindale, 2015; Martaindale & Blair, 2017; Martaindale, Sandel, & Blair, 2017). Specifically, ALERRT has utilized case studies of active shooter events to develop improved curriculum to better prepare first responders to respond to similar situations (Martaindale & Blair, 2019).

For these reasons, ALERRT staff will draw on 20 years of experience training first responders and researching best practices to fulfill the Texas DPS request and objectively evaluate the law enforcement response to the May 24, 2022, attack at Robb Elementary School. This initial report will be focused on the portion of the response up until the suspect was neutralized.

The information presented in this report is based on a incident briefing held for select ALERRT staff on June 1, 2022. The briefing, which was held for approximately 1 hour, was led by an investigating officer with knowledge of the event and investigative details. Briefing materials included surveillance footage from the school, Google Maps, a brief cell phone video, and verbal questions and answers between ALERRT staff and the investigator. We were first oriented to the location of this incident by the investigator via Google Maps. We were then given a chronological timeline of events and actions by the investigator as we reviewed the cell phone and school surveillance video. All times presented in this report are based on timelines provided by investigators. Additionally, we have received additional information as the investigation is still ongoing. The timeline presented here is based on the most current information as of 6/30/2022.

The report will begin by presenting a thorough timeline of events as evidenced through video footage and details garnered from the ongoing investigation. Each entry cites the data source (refer to abbreviations presented on the Table of Contents). Following the timeline, we will comment on tactics utilized by responding officers. Information related to breaching options will be presented as a supplemental attachment at the end of the report. The tactical discussion is the opinion of ALERRT, and it is based on years of extensive training, research, and an ever-evolving understanding of active shooter response. The concepts discussed are foundational to ALERRT's nationwide training curriculum. While the discussion will be frank and objective, it is not meant to demean the actions taken by law enforcement during this incident. Rather, the discussion is intended to improve future response. For this reason, attention will be drawn to actions that worked well and actions that did not.

Detailed Timeline




Figure 1. Overhead View

At 11:27:14, a female teacher (Female 1) exits the exterior door in the west hall propping the door open with a rock to prevent it from closing behind her (see Figure 2 for suspect entry point). (ISS)

At 11:28:25, the suspect becomes involved in a motor vehicle crash in a dry canal near the elementary school. Two people from a nearby business approached the crash scene at 11:29:02. The suspect engaged them both with a rifle. The two people were able to flee back to the business unharmed and called 9-1-1. (FH)

At 11:29:40, Female 1 returns through the west entry deliberately kicking the rock from the door jamb. Female 1 pulls the door shut and continues to look out of the exterior door as she is frantically speaking on her cell phone. Female 1 attempts to enter a door on the south side of the west hallway only to find it locked. Female 1 knocked on the door, and it was eventually answered by another female (Female 2). Female 1 appears to advise Female 2 of the emergency whereupon Female 2 re-enters her room and secures the door. Female 1 moves into a room closest to the exit on the north side of the west hallway. Female 1 re-enters the hallway numerous times yelling down the hall for students to get into their classrooms. (ISS)

At 11:30:14, the suspect, wearing dark clothing and carrying a bag, left the crash scene and climbed a chain-link fence onto the elementary school property. The suspect walked deliberately across the open grounds between the fence and the teachers' parking lot. The suspect moved towards the school buildings on the westmost side of the campus. Although a defect that might have been caused by a bullet was located on a building south of the affected structure, it could not be

substantiated at this time that any rounds were fired at a teacher and children on the playground at the time of the crash. (FH)

At 11:31:36, the suspect is captured on video between the cars shooting, and a Uvalde Patrol unit is captured arriving at the crash site. (FH)

At 11:31:43, a Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police officer drives through the west gate near the crash site and across the field to the south side of the affected building, at a high rate of speed. (FH)

At 11:32:08, the suspect reached the west teachers' parking lot adjacent to the affected building and fired through windows into the westmost rooms prior to entering the building. (FH and audio file from ISS)




Figure 2. Suspect Entry Point

Prior to the suspect's entry into the building at 11:33:00, according to statements, a Uvalde Police Officer on scene at the crash site observed the suspect carrying a rifle outside the west hall entry. The officer, armed with a rifle, asked his supervisor for permission to shoot the suspect. However, the supervisor either did not hear or responded too late. The officer turned to get confirmation from his supervisor and when he turned back to address the suspect, he had entered the west hallway unabated. (OS per investigating officer interview).

Note: The internal school surveillance (ISS) video consisted of a ceiling-mounted camera that was situated at the intersection of three intersecting hallways (as indicated by the yellow star in Figure 3) This camera captured 1) the suspect's entry point, which was the short (West) hallway leading to an exterior door; 2) a second long hallway (South) with multiple classrooms on either side of the hall and an exterior door at the southmost end of the hall; and 3) a third hallway (East) that leads to other classrooms, restrooms, a teachers' lounge, a library, and an exterior door at the eastmost end of the hallway.



Figure 3. West Building Layout

At 11:33:00, the suspect enters the school from the exterior door in the west hall while holding a rifle. The suspect looked around the hallway and then continued to walk down the west hallway before turning right (down the south hallway). The suspect walked past a series of rooms with closed doors and a firewall “break.” before making his way to room 111 and 112. (ISS)

At 11:33:24, upon reaching rooms 111 and 112, the suspect fired a series of rounds from the hallway in the direction of classrooms 111 and 112. (ISS)

At 11:33:32, the suspect made entry into what appears to be classroom 111. Immediately, children's screams could be heard along with numerous gunshots in the classrooms. The rate of fire was initially very rapid then slowed, lasting only a few seconds. (ISS)

At 11:33:37, the suspect backed out of what appears to be classroom 111 into the south hallway. The suspect made a slight turn to what appears to be his left and fires a series of rounds from the hallway into classroom 112. The suspect then re-enters what appears to be classroom 111 and continues to fire what is estimated to be over 100 rounds by 11:36:04 (according to audio analysis). During the shooting the sounds of children screaming, and crying, could be heard (according to audio analysis). (ISS)




Figure 4. Officers Initial Entry into West Building

After the suspect made entry into the west building, three Uvalde Police Department (UPD) officers gathered on Geraldine Street (behind police vehicles) in front of the school drop-off / pick-up area. Then the officers, using a bounding overwatch tactic, move quickly (one at a time) to the west door.

At 11:35:55, all three Uvalde Police Department (UPD) officers entered the structure through the west door into the west hallway. These officers were equipped with the following: one with external armor and two with concealable body armor, two rifles, and three pistols. At 11:36:00, four officers entered the south hallway through the south door closest to the suspect. It is not clear what equipment these officers had with them. Four more officers entered the west hallway through the west door at 11:36:03. Three of these officers were from the UPD and one was from the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District Police Department (UCISD PD). They were equipped with three external body armor carriers and one with concealable body armor and pistols. (ISS)

It did not appear that any of the officers were in possession of breaching tools, medical equipment, ballistic shields, or “go-bags.” (ISS)

NOTE: *A “go-bag” is typically a bag or backpack that is widely used in the law enforcement community to respond to critical incidents. The “go-bag” commonly consists of spare ammunition, medical equipment, and breaching tools. The purpose of the “go-bag” is to carry equipment needed for a specialized response, when carrying that equipment on a regular basis is not feasible. Taking a “go-bag” into a crisis site facilitates the availability and implementation of these tools in a patrol response where tactical assets and teams are not readily available.*

At 11:36:04, the last shots from the initial barrage from the suspect were fired. There were seven officers in the west hallway and four officers in the south hallway. (ISS)

At 11:36:10, officers from the west and south hallway advanced to rooms 111 and 112. As the officers entered the threshold of rooms 111 and 112, they were fired upon by the suspect, who was in room 111. The gunfire at 11:37:00 and 11:37:10 drove the officers away from the threshold of room 111 and 112 and back to the west and south hallways prior to either team making contact with either room 111 or 112 classroom doors. (ISS)

At 11:38:38, the suspect concludes firing, according to audio estimates 11 rounds are fired. (ISS)

Investigators advised that two officers were injured by building material fragments caused by the suspect’s rounds passing through the walls. (IOI and ISS)

Officers generally remained at the intersection of the west and south hallway and in the south hallway near the south entrance until the final assault. (IOI and ISS)

At 11:38:11, officers on scene, but outside of the hallway, call for additional assistance to include a tactical team with specialized capabilities. (BWC and UPD CS)

At 11:38:37, an officer outside of the hallway advises the suspect “is contained.” (BWC)

At 11:40:58, the suspect fires 1 round according to audio estimates. (ISS)

At 11:41:30, dispatch asked via radio if the door was locked, a UPD officer responds, “I am not sure, but we have a hooligan to break it.” (BWC)

At 11:44:00, the suspect fires one more round according to audio estimates. (ISS)

At 11:48:18, a UCISD PD officer enters through the west hallway door and states, "She says she is shot," referring to his wife. He is escorted outside of the building. (BWC)

By 11:51:20, law enforcement from various agencies (including UPD, UCISD PD, Uvalde Sheriff's Office (USO), Fire Marshals, Constable Deputies, Southwest Texas Junior College Police Department (SWTJC PD), and the United States Border Patrol (BP) had arrived at the scene and were moving inside and out to evaluate the situation. (ISS, UPD CS, RL)

At 11:52:08, the first ballistic shield entered the west hallway. (ISS)

At 11:53:10, a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) special agent arrived at the perimeter and was advised to man the perimeter. Another officer makes a comment about there being kids still in the building, the DPS special agent advised, "if there is then they just need to go in."

At 11:56:49, the DPS special agent states "there's still kids over here. So, I'm getting the kids out!" (BWC)

At 12:03:51, a second ballistic shield arrives, and at 12:04:16 a third shield arrives on scene in the west hallway. (ISS)

At 12:06:16, UPD RL notes that no Command Post is set up, advised bodies needed to keep parents out. (RL)

At 12:10:17, officers in the west hallway begin passing out and donning gas masks. (ISS)

At 12:14:10, CS gas cannisters and launcher deliverable varieties are brought in. (ISS)

By 12:13:00, dispatchers had received numerous 9-1-1 calls from a child explaining that there were several children and one of her teachers deceased and another teacher hurt in room 112. (UPD 9-1-1)

At 12:15:27, it appears tactical team members of United States Border Patrol Tactical Teams (BORTAC) arrive and assist with fortifying the law enforcement position at the intersection with ballistic shields. (ISS)

At 12:20:46, a fourth ballistic shield arrives in the west hallway. (ISS)

At 12:21:08, four shots are fired by the suspect from within one of the two classrooms. (ISS)

At 12:21:22, BORTAC members move to a set of double doors within 36' of rooms 111 and 112 bringing two ballistic shields. However, no assault on the rooms was conducted. (ISS)

At 12:23:35, BP medical team members began setting up medical triage in the east hallway in front of the restrooms. They had numerous backboards, medical kits, a defibrillator as well as bleeding control supplies. (ISS)

From 12:21:16 until 12:34:38, a continuous conversation takes place in the south hallway, involving UCISD PD Chief Arredondo and a UPD officer discussing tactical options and considerations including snipers, windows, and how to get into the classroom. They also discussed who has the keys, testing keys, the probability of the door being locked, and if kids and teachers are dying or dead. (BWC)

At 12:35:39, BP agents arrive in the west hallway with the first observed breaching tool, a Halligan tool. (ISS)

From 12:37:45 until 12:47:25, UCISD PD Chief Arredondo attempts to negotiate with the suspect, speaking in English and Spanish. The Chief also calls someone to try to look into the windows from outside, he then begins asking for more keys. At 12:46:18, he exclaims, "If y'all are ready to do it, you do it. But you should distract him out that window." At 12:47:25, Chief Arredondo states, "He's going in! He's going in! Tell those guys on the west that they're going in! Let 'em know!" (BWC)

At 12:47:57, a USO deputy arrives in the west hallway with a sledgehammer. (ISS)

At 12:50:03, an ad Hoc team assaults room 111, neutralizing the suspect. The suspect had concealed himself in a book closet, he then emerged when the team made entry. Footage showed officers frantically carrying the dead and injured to the casualty collection point (CCP) in the east hallway. Some law enforcement officers rushed casualties directly through the exterior door at the end of the west hallway. It is unknown if medical personnel (EMS) were staged nearby for direct patient handoff. (ISS)

The result of this incident was 19 children and two adults killed with an additional 17 reported injuries. Additionally, the suspect was neutralized through gunfire in the assault.

Physical Site Assessment

The investigator escorted ALERRT staff to the crime scene for a site walkthrough. As expected, there was a large quantity of dry blood on the floors in all three hallways. There were noticeable penetrating ballistic defects throughout various walls in the south hall.

The classroom doors were inset just over 36" into a 90-degree inset from the hallway to accommodate the swing of the outward opening classroom doors towards the hall. Each inset had two separate doors, side-by-side, leading into a separate classroom. The door on the left-hand side of the inset opened outward from right to left, and the door on the right-hand side of the inset opened outward from left to right as seen in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Classroom Layout

The classroom doors were class 2 steel doors. The classroom doors had safety glass with security wire mesh imbedded (see Figure 6). The hardware consisted of a single metal door handle locking latch, three exterior metal hinges, and a door closure device mounted to the top inside portion of the door. The door jambs were composed of steel and set in a metal stud and sheetrock wall.



Figure 6. Class 2 Steel Door

The door to room 111 had been removed for evidentiary purposes and collection. Once the evidence had been removed the door was left on the floor of the room. The door for room 112 was intact and in place. There was a noticeable concentration of exiting bullet defects in the area of the inset. There were noticeable bullet defects on the door jamb of classroom 111, approximately 5' from floor level. Both rooms 111 and 112 possessed an extraordinary amount of dry blood concentrated on the floor.

The exterior walls of each classroom had two 3' x 4' windows near the opposing corners of each classroom (see Figure 3). The bottom of each window was approximately 3' from interior floor level, and they were equipped with mini blinds. From the exterior, the windows were approximately 4' from ground level. The windows were composed of a heavy aluminum frame with three lateral cross beams that held four (4) 1'x3' panes of tempered glass, as seen in Figure 7.



Figure 7. Exterior Classroom Window

An exterior window on the right-hand side as you enter room 111 had a clear bullet defect. Based on the fragmented spiderweb pattern it was evident that the window was composed of safety glass, which fragments into small pieces when it is struck with enough force to break.

It appears the investigative teams cut out sections of sheetrock in the south hall to collect evidence. The interior walls were constructed with vertical metal studs every 16". Pink fiberglass insulation was installed between each vertical metal stud and was encapsulated between sheetrock material to form walls that separated each "paired" set of classrooms.

An assessment of the classroom closet, on the exterior wall, which is directly opposite of the classroom door, revealed that the exterior wall was cinder block on the inner portions and decorative brick on the exterior (as seen in Figure 7).

Tactical Assessment

While the previous section detailed the timeline, the following discussion will assess different tactical issues present in the response. We will use the most recent version of our Level I manual (v.7.2) as our primary reference (ALERT & FBI, 2020). We are breaking this discussion into three parts: 1) circumstances outside the building prior to suspect entering building, 2) initial officer response, and 3) changing environment leading to the eventual assault on room 111.

Circumstances Before the Suspect Entered the Building

We identified three key issues that occurred prior to the suspect gaining entry to the building. First, a teacher propped open the exterior door at 11:27:14. ALERT staff noted rocks (some of which were painted) were placed at most external doors of the building. Based on this observation, it appears that propping doors open is common practice at this school. While the teacher did kick the rock and close the door prior to the suspect making entry, and the propping open of the door did not affect what happened in this situation, circumventing access control procedures can create a situation that results in danger to students. After the teacher closed the door, she did not check to see if the door was locked. Perhaps this was because the door is usually locked. However, on this day the door was not locked, and because it was not locked, the attacker was able to immediately access the building. This again highlights the importance of not circumventing access control procedures. Even if the teacher had checked to see if the door was locked, it appears that she did not have the proper key or tool to engage the locking mechanism on the door. Finally, we note that the door was a steel frame with a large glass inlay. This glass was not ballistic glass, nor was there film on the glass to maintain the integrity of the door if the suspect shot the glass. This suggests that the suspect would have been able to gain access to the building even if the door was locked.

Second, one of the first responding officers (UCISD PD) drove through the parking lot on the west side of the building at a high rate of speed. The suspect was in the parking lot at this time, but the officer did not see him. If the officer had driven more slowly or had parked his car at the edge of the school property and approached on foot, he might have seen the suspect and been able to engage him before the suspect entered the building (ALERT & FBI, 2020, p. 3-4.)

Third, a Uvalde PD officer reported that he was at the crash site and observed the suspect carrying a rifle prior to the suspect entering the west hall exterior door. The UPD officer was armed with a rifle and sighted in to shoot the attacker; however, he asked his supervisor for permission to shoot. The UPD officer did not hear a response and turned to get confirmation from his supervisor. When he turned back to address the suspect, the suspect had already entered the west hall exterior door at 11:33:00. The officer was justified in using deadly force to stop the attacker. Texas Penal Code § 9.32, DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PERSON states, an individual is justified in using deadly force when the individual reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to prevent the commission of murder (amongst other crimes). In this instance, the UPD officer would have heard gunshots and/or reports of gunshots and observed an individual approaching the school building armed with a rifle. A reasonable officer would conclude in this case, based upon the totality of the circumstances, that use of deadly force was warranted. Furthermore, the UPD officer was approximately 148 yards from the west hall exterior door. One-hundred and forty-eight yards

is well within the effective range of an AR-15 platform. The officer did comment that he was concerned that if he missed his shot, the rounds could have penetrated the school and injured students. We also note that current State of Texas standards for patrol rifle qualifications do not require officers to fire their rifles from more than 100 yards away from the target. It is, therefore, possible that the officer had never fired his rifle at a target that was that far away. Ultimately, the decision to use deadly force always lies with the officer who will use the force. If the officer was not confident that he could both hit his target and of his backdrop if he missed, he should not have fired.

If any of these three key issues had worked out differently, they could have stopped the tragedy that followed. First, had the exterior door been secured, the suspect may have never gained access to the building. At the very least, the suspect would have been delayed and responding officers would have had more time to find and stop the shooter before he entered the building. The UCISD PD officer might have seen the suspect had the officer not been driving as fast or if he had approached on foot. Lastly, had the UPD officer engaged the suspect with his rifle, he may have been able to neutralize, or at least distract, the suspect preventing him from entering the building.

Initial Response Within Building

We identified three key issues that occurred before the suspect entered rooms 111 and 112 for the last time. First, Uvalde ISD had protocols in place requiring doors to remain locked at all times, and the school was currently on an active lockdown prior to the suspect gaining entry to the school. The suspect was still able to gain access to room 111. We received information from the investigating officer that the lock on room 111 had been reported as damaged multiple times; however, this has not been confirmed through work orders at this time. Regardless, the suspect is seen entering the room, exiting the room, and then reentering the room again prior to officers entering the building at 11:35:55. The only way to engage the lock is to insert a key from the hallway side of the door. At no point is the suspect observed entering the hallway and engaging the locking mechanism. Based upon this, we believe that the lock to room 111 was never engaged.

The second issue involves having teams of officers at both ends of the south hallway. ALERRT teaches that a single team should be in a single area of building at a time (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, pp. 2-20 to 2-26 & 7-4). Having multiple teams or splitting an existing team can create a crossfire situation. If the suspect had emerged from the classrooms, officers from both teams presumably would have opened fire resulting in a high likelihood of officers at either end of the hallway shooting officers at the other end. The teams should have quickly communicated, and officers at one end of the hallway should have backed out and redeployed to another position. Additionally, ALERRT teaches that teams consist of up to 4 members (ALERRT and FBI, 2020, pp. 4-1 to 4-27). Teams larger than 4 tend to create congestion and interfere with the ability of the team to operate quickly and effectively. Therefore, once 4 officers were in the south hallway area of the building, no additional officers were needed in that area. Additional officers should have been assigned other tasks.

The third issue revolves around losing momentum. The first three responding UPD officers enter the west hall exterior door at 11:35:55 and an additional four officers entered the south hall at

11:36:00. Audio recordings indicate the suspect was actively firing his weapon until 11:36:04. The first responding officers correctly moved toward the active gunfire, which was acting as their driving force (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, pp. 2-15 to 2-16, 2-26, 2-33). The seven officers converged on rooms 111 and 112 at 11:37:00. As the officers approached the doors, the suspect began firing. This gunfire caused both teams of officers to retreat from the doors. We note that the officers **did not** make contact with the doors (i.e., they never touched any part of the doors). The team approaching from the north fell back to the T-intersection of the west and south hallways. This position is approximately 67 feet from the doors of rooms 111 and 112. The team approaching from the south fell back to the south end of the south hallway. The team in the south hallway were not visible on camera, so their distance from the affected classrooms is unknown.

ALERRT teaches that first responders' main priority in an active shooter situation is to first **Stop the Killing** and then **Stop the Dying** (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, pp. 2-9, 2-15 to 2-16). Inherent in both stopping the killing and dying is the priority of life scale (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, pp. 2-6 & 2-34). At the top of this scale, the first priority is to preserve the lives of victims/potential victims. Second, is the safety of the officers, and last is the suspect. This ordering means that we expect officers to assume risk to save innocent lives. Responding to an active shooter is a dangerous task (Blair & Duron, 2022). There is a chance that officers will be shot, injured, or even killed while responding. This is something that every officer should be acutely aware of when they become a law enforcement officer.

To adhere to the priority of life, the first responding officers' actions should be determined based on the current driving force. In this instance, there is a suspect actively shooting inside an occupied elementary school. The active gunfire is the driving force, and the officers correctly responded to this driving force by moving toward the rooms that were being attacked.

Ideally, the officers would have placed accurate return fire on the attacker when the attacker began shooting at them. ALERRT trains the widely-used ABCs of cover – Accurate return fire, Body armor, and Cover (ALERRT & FBI, 2020, p. 2-21; Blair et al., 2013). The ABCs give the first responder a tiered approach to achieving cover while maintaining control of the situation. Further, the ABCs are presented in order of preference (A first, B second, C third). As noted in Figure 6, there was a window in the center of each classroom door. Officers could have utilized the window to send accurate return fire back at the suspect. Even though the room was darker than the hallway, the suspect would have been backlit by the exterior windows and muzzle flashes would have been present. Obviously, this return fire must be consistent with the fundamental firearms safety rules (e.g., the officers must ensure that students will not be hit by the officers' return fire). Any officer with body armor should have squared their body armor to the threat to improve protection. In this situation, we don't believe the last course of action (moving to cover) was a viable option because the interior construction of the school would not stop bullets, and therefore, was not cover. Maintaining position or even pushing forward to a better spot to deliver accurate return fire would have undoubtedly been dangerous, and there would have been a high probability that some of the officers would have been shot or even killed. However, the officers also would likely have been able to stop the attacker and then focus on getting immediate medical care to the wounded.

It is not surprising that officers who had never been shot at before would be overwhelmed by the directed gunfire. This is especially the case if they had not been consistently training to deal with this type of threat. However, even after retreating, the officers were still presented with a clear driving force. The suspect was actively firing his weapon when the officers entered the building, and a reasonable officer would assume that there were injured people in the classrooms. The officers also knew the suspect was still alive and preventing them from accessing the wounded in the classrooms. These injured people are a driving force (ALERT & FBI, 2020, p. 2-17) Once the officers retreated, they should have quickly made a plan to stop the attacker and gain access to the wounded. There were several possible plans that could have been implemented. We list a few here:

- A. Perhaps the simplest plan would have been to push the team back down the hallway and attempt to control the classrooms from the windows in the doors. Any officer wearing rifle-rated body armor (e.g., plates) would have assumed the lead as they had an additional level of protection. A team of 4 officers could have utilized the windows in the doors to control a large portion of the classroom from the hallway. Two officers would have taken angular positions on each window. This would have allowed them to cover a large portion of each classroom and the officers would have been likely to see and engage the attacker. Again, this would have been dangerous, but the priority of life scale dictates that the officers assume risk to save innocent lives. It is also worth noting, the officers had weapons (including rifles), body armor (which may or may not have been rated to stop rifle rounds), training, and backup. The victims in the classrooms had none of these things. If the classroom doors were locked, some of the officers on the door windows would have been able to provide cover while the other officers breached the doors.
- B. If the officers believed that they could not establish control through the doors, they should have found another way to stop the killing and dying. One option would have been to breach the exterior windows of the classrooms. Ideally, this would have involved breaking more than one window simultaneously and then raking the blinds out of the window. It is likely that the suspect would have fired at the officers, but the exterior construction of the building would have provided them with good cover. After the windows were broken (i.e., ported), the officers could have planned to simultaneously stand up in the windows to confront the attacker (i.e., cover). The room would have been substantially darker than the bright exterior conditions at the time. However, breaking the windows and raking the blinds would have increased lighting in the room. Hand-held or weapon-mounted lights could also have been used to increase visibility (see Supplementary information regarding an assessment of breaching options).
- C. Both options a and b could have been done simultaneously. The window breaks could have been used to signal the start of the assault and draw the suspect's attention from the doors. The window officers would stay behind the cover of the exterior wall while the door officers had priority of fire. Then the window officers could stand and cover the rest of the room.
- D. Other options (such as breaching the sheetrock walls or having an officer run past the rooms to draw fire while other officers moved up to cover the interior windows) could also have

been utilized. Each of these alternatives would have had various strengths and weaknesses but would have regained momentum for the officers.

None of these actions were taken. While it would have taken a few minutes to coordinate and execute any of these actions once the officers retreated from the rooms, taking 2, 3, 5 or even 10 minutes to do so would have been preferable to the more than an hour it took to ultimately assault the room.

We commend the officers for quickly entering the building and moving toward the sounds of gunfire. However, when the officers were fired at, momentum was lost. The officers fell back, and it took more than an hour to regain momentum and gain access to critically injured people.

Changing Circumstances Prior to Assault

As discussed, the situation became static at 11:38:37. Prior to this, at 11:38:11, the UCISD PD Chief called for additional assistance (tactical teams and equipment). The responding officers began treating the situation as a hostage/barricade rather than an active shooter event. The timeline shows that the shooter was killed at 12:50:03. This section will describe the escalating circumstances that unraveled over the one hour, eleven minutes, and twenty-six seconds between officers taking static positions and the moment the suspect was killed. We will detail key moments where officers' capabilities increased due to arriving equipment and personnel as well as moments where the exigency of the situation increased due to either suspect actions (e.g., firing his weapon) or additional information (e.g., injured people) being communicated to the officers inside the building.

A reasonable officer would have considered this an active situation and devised a plan to address the suspect. Even if the suspect was no longer firing his weapon, his presence and prior actions were preventing officers from accessing victims in the classroom to render medical aid (ALERT & FBI, 2020, p. 2-17).

For the sake of argument, we will assume that officers believed the active shooter situation had transformed into a hostage barricade starting at 11:38:37. We'll also assume that officers needed additional equipment and/or trained tacticians to perform the room assault. In a hostage/barricade, officers are taught to utilize the 5 Cs (Contain, Control, Communicate, Call SWAT, Create a Plan; ALERT & FBI, 2020, pp. 2-17 to 2-19). In this instance, the suspect was contained in rooms 111 and 112. The officers established control in that they slowed down the assault. However, the officers did not establish communication with the suspect. The UCISD PD Chief did request SWAT/tactical teams. SWAT was called, but it takes time for the operators to arrive on scene. In the meantime, it is imperative that an immediate action plan is created. This plan is used if active violence occurs. It appears that the officers did not create an immediate action plan.

Factors Increasing Exigency

We identified two factors that we believe increased the exigency of the situation and should have prompted officers to execute an immediate action plan. These factors were ongoing gunfire and the presence of injured people.

Gunfire. At 11:40:58, the suspect fired one shot. At 11:44:00, the suspect fired another shot, and finally, at 12:21:08, the suspect fired 4 more shots. During each of these instances, the situation had gone active, and the immediate action plan should have been triggered because it was reasonable to believe that people were being killed.

Injured People. While it is unclear whether the information from 9-1-1 about injured people in the classrooms was being communicated to officers on the inside of the school, at 11:48:18, a UCISD PD officer enters through the west hallway door and states, “She says she is shot,” referring to his wife. The officer was looking at his phone when he relayed the information to the other officers in the hallway. Based on statements, he had received a call from his wife in the room. This statement illustrates officers on scene were aware of at least one injured person in need of assistance.

Factors Increasing Capability

In addition to information that should have increased the exigency of the situation, a variety of factors increased the capabilities of the officers while dealing with these threats. These included breaching tools, shields, tactical operators, and CS gas. Please refer to Figure 8 on page 20 for a detailed timeline of the factors that increased both exigency and officer capability.

Breaching Tools. A UPD officer stated that they had a Halligan at 11:41:30 when asked by dispatch if the doors were locked. This tool was not seen on camera, and if he was referring to the tool being on scene or at the UPD is unclear. A Halligan tool was captured on camera at 12:35:39. A USO deputy arrives on scene with a sledgehammer at 12:47:57. This completed the toolset needed to breach an outward opening door.

Ballistic Shields. The first ballistic shield arrives on scene at 11:52:08. A second ballistic shield arrived at 12:03:51, a third ballistic shield arrived at 12:04:16, and a fourth ballistic shield arrived at 12:20:46. Each ballistic shield afforded first responders additional protection from potential gunfire. We do not have information about the ballistic rating of each shield at this point.

Tactical Operators. While many officers flowed through the scene, the first known tactical operators (i.e., BORTAC) arrived at 12:15:27. BORTAC operators receive extensive training and equipment to respond to barricaded suspects. Additionally, it is common for tactical operations to be turned over to tactical operators upon their arrival; however, it appears that control of tactical operations was not given to the tactical operators on scene.

CS Gas. Between 12:10:17 and 12:14:10, gas masks were passed out and CS gas cannisters and launchers were on scene.

The assault team entered the room at 12:50:03, 1 hour, 11 minutes, and 26 seconds after the first responding officers took static positions. The assault team had keys that could unlock the door. It

does not appear that any officer ever tested the doors to see if they were locked. As we described earlier, we do not believe the door to room 111 was locked.

As this section illustrates, there were multiple points in time where the driving force increased through additional gunfire; however, officers did not act on these increases in driving force. Additionally, officers on scene continually received additional equipment and tactical components that increased their capabilities to address the suspect. Ultimately it is unclear why the officers decided to assault the room at 12:50:03. There was no apparent change in driving force or response capability at this point.

While we do not have definitive information at this point, it is possible that some of the people who died during this event could have been saved if they had received more rapid medical care. In the next part of this AAR, we intend to address that Stop the Dying portion of the response that occurred following the killing of the suspect.

Additionally, we have noted in this report that it does not appear that effective incident command was established during this event. The lack of effective command likely impaired both the Stop the Killing and Stop the Dying parts of the response. The final part of this AAR will address incident command issues.




Figure 8. Exigency vs Capability Timeline

Supplemental Materials

Breaching Assessment and Opportunities

The initial wave of officers in this incident worked to locate and identify the location of the suspect. However, in doing so, they were met with a difficult challenge posed by the suspect; they were being fired at while attempting to enter the classroom where the suspect, victims, and casualties were located. Furthermore, the officers did not have any breaching tools. For the purposes of this report, breaching tools refer to common tools that are expected to be carried and utilized during active shooter / active attack events. The responding officers making the initial approach did not have immediate access to ballistic shields. The officer's overall level of training is unknown at this point.

ALERRT staff conducted a series of tests at Robb Elementary School incorporating critical thinking and breaching techniques to determine possibilities that may have changed the incident outcome. ALERRT staff used non-traditional tools that can be purchased at most any hardware store or obtained from a firetruck. The tools used were a 10LB sledgehammer, a Stanley Fat Maxx, and a Halligan tool (see Figure 9).



Figure 9. Breaching Tools

Keyed Entry

After much discussion and observation, it was clear that an unshielded officer faced imminent serious bodily injury or death if they were to attempt to unlock the door. This was proven during the initial responding officers first attempt to open the door. The breach point and inset locations in the south hall received heavy gunfire, and this breach method, alone, was untenable.

Pry

ALERRT staff performed a “pry” on the door using a Stanley Fat Maxx and a sledgehammer. The breaching technique was recorded and performed relatively quickly (the door was opened in 3-4

seconds). Although the breach was conducted quickly, and a positive breach was established, there was still a substantial risk of serious bodily injury or death to officers if this breach were to be performed without a ballistic shield.

Pry with a Distraction

The purpose of implementing a distraction during the breach is to redirect the suspect's focus away from the breach point while the breach is performed. In this case, banging on a wall in the south hallway was used as a distraction. The distraction was initiated, and a positive breach was established relatively quickly (i.e., 3-4 seconds). When the door was opened the ALERRT staff member that was placed in the room as a suspect was focused on the wall where the distraction was performed. The distraction afforded the breachers time to perform the breach while lowering the risk of serious bodily injury or death.

Breaching an outward opening door with a sledgehammer

Typically, outward opening doors are breached using a pry technique. There are techniques that can be used to breach outward opening doors using a sledgehammer or ramming technique. This technique was attempted and proven to not be a viable option due to the construction of the metal door. A positive breach was not established, and performing this technique took a long time. Unshielded, the probability of serious bodily injury or death would be high.

Wall Breaching

Utilizing the walls in an adjoining classroom, a series of wall breaches were conducted. The purpose for a wall breach is to create a distraction prior to conducting a pry breach. Additionally, a wall breach can create a port hole allowing officers to engage the suspect through the opening.

Using a sledgehammer with the strike face toward the wall, a distraction was created by striking the wall multiple times. The strikes resulted in limited penetration to the interior wall in the adjacent classroom.

Using a sledgehammer with the strike face turned sideways, a port was created with 2-3 strikes to the wall. Any remaining insulation materials were removed by hand to clear out the opening.

Using the Stanley Fat Maxx, a distraction was performed by penetrating the sheetrock into the adjacent room with a single puncture through the wall.

It was evident that the suspect in this attack fired numerous rounds from a rifle that penetrated the sheetrock walls. These distractions/ports offer a breaching option but still come with a risk for unshielded officers.

Pry with a window distraction

This breaching method incorporated an exterior window breach as a distraction while simultaneously prying the classroom door. The windows were breached with a Halligan tool while the interior door was breached with a Stanley Fat Maxx and sledgehammer. The window breach added to the tactical advantage by causing the subject in the room to direct attention to the windows while the interior breach team was able to breach, enter, and address the subject.

It was found that “port and cover” on the window was challenging due to miniblinds obstructing view and unequal lighting conditions.

- Port and cover refers to breaching a window and addressing threats from that opening.
- Miniblinds or obstructions would need to be cleared with a breaching tool for a view into the room,
- The classroom was significantly darkened without artificial lighting while the exterior was relatively sunny and bright. When the exterior window was breached, the unequal lighting conditions resulted in the exterior members having diminished capabilities to see into the dark classroom to acquire a target. Raking the blinds out would increase the lighting in the room, and hand-held or weapon mounted lights could further improve lighting conditions.

Additional Breaching Options

Vehicle Breaching. The use of a motor vehicle to breach fortified locations should always be considered as a breaching option in matters of exigent circumstances and loss of life. However, in this incident, vehicle breaching was not a viable option due to the construction and layout of the school. Vehicle breaching was also not feasible because the officers were unsure where innocent children and teachers were located in the room.

Ballistic Breaching. The use of a 12-gauge shotgun and 00 buck is another viable breaching method that could have or may have been used with the proper equipment and training.

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Appendix H

2019 and 2021 Legislation Related to School Safety

Act	Code Section	2019 Overview	School Safety Commission Recommendation
<u>190</u>	Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-2003 Comprehensive School Counseling Program and Plan Framework	School Counseling Improvement Act -Requires each district to develop a comprehensive school counseling plan that focuses on the needs of the individual district; and -Ensures that counselors are afforded the time needed to work with students during student contact days by minimizing the assignment of administrative duties during time when direct and indirect support to students is appropriate. Increased from 75% to 90%.	MHP: #5
<u>245</u>	Ark. Code Ann. § 6-10-133 Bleeding Control Training	Requires that each public school shall provide bleeding control training as a component of a health course to be taught to students in grades nine through twelve (9-12).	AEOPD: #6
<u>629</u>	Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-1701 et seq.	Established the requirements for having institutional law enforcement officers.	LES: #6
<u>640</u>	Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-502 Rules for Development of School District Student Discipline Policies	District student discipline policies must: -Address: -Assaults/Threats -Possession of Firearm -Be reviewed annually along with State and District discipline data. -Include: -Prevention, intervention, and conflict resolution provisions -Programs, measures, or alternative means and methods to continue student engagement and access to education when suspended or expelled. Requires teachers, administrators, classified employees, and volunteers to be provided “appropriate student discipline, behavioral intervention, and classroom management training and support.	MHP: #3

1029	Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-711 Bullying Prevention - PD	<p>Requires DESE to require two (2) hours of PD for licensed personnel:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Bullying prevention; and -Recognition of the relationship between bullying and suicide <p>Requires DESE to develop guidance to assist in resolving complaints concerning student bullying behaviors – which will be provided to licensed personnel during PD.</p> <p>Clarifies that “cyberbullying” is bullying.</p> <p>Requires that the superintendent, one (1) time each school year, report discipline data to the school board of the district at a public hearing.</p>	MHP: #2
1029	Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-514 Antibullying Policies	<p>Requires:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Responding to reports of bullying “as soon as reasonably practicable” by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Notifying parents of victim, and -Preparing a written report of alleged incident; -Promptly investigating a credible report and completing within five (5) school days; -Notifying parents of perpetrator; -A written record of investigation and result; -Discussion of available counseling and intervention services with involved students. <p>Additional requirements for district policies, including annual reevaluation, reassessment, and review of policies.</p>	MHP: #2

Act	Code Section	2021 Overview	School Safety Commission Recommendation
<u>182</u>	Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-629 Training and Instruction for School Boards	Changed the requirement created by Act 1029 of 2019 that school boards receive training “regarding school safety and student discipline” from one time to annually.	MHP: #2
<u>551</u> & <u>622</u>	Ark. Code Ann. § 6-10-128 School Resource Officers	<p>Requires that “sworn, nonsupervisory law enforcement personnel” on campus during the day or employed by the school obtain certification in Youth Mental Health First Aid within 18 months.</p> <p>-YMHFA certification must be renewed every 4 years</p> <p>Requires that school boards that accept an SRO enter into an MOU with the local law enforcement agency, or adopt policies and procedures if the school district has an institutional law enforcement officer (§ 6-13-1701), that governs the SRO and includes without limitation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The financial responsibility of each party - The chain of command - The process for the selection of SROs - The process for the evaluation of SROs - The training requirements for SROs; and - The roles and responsibilities of SROs, which shall include without limitation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - clarification of SROs role in student discipline - the use of physical restraints or chemical sprays; - the use of firearms; and - making arrests on the public school campus 	MHP: #3 LES: #3 & 4 IC: #4
<u>620</u> & <u>648</u>	Ark. Code Ann. § 6-15-1303 Safe Schools	Requires a school district to conduct a comprehensive school safety audit every 3 years (initial due no later than Aug. 1,	MHP: #1 & 2 AEOPD: #5

	Initiative Act	<p>2024) to assess the safety, security, accessibility, and emergency preparedness of district buildings and grounds in collaboration with local law enforcement, fire, and emergency management officials, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Safety and security of site and exterior of buildings; - Access control; - Safety and security of interior of buildings; - Monitoring and surveillance; - Communication and information security; - Emergency operation plans; and - School climate and culture. 	
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Other Relevant Laws and Rules:

Act	Code Section	Overview	School Safety Commission Recommendation
541 of 2017	Ark. Code Ann. § 6-15-1304	<p>Records or other information related to a public school district that operates a Pre-K or services any K-12 students, are confidential and exempt from FOIA in the following instances:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - records or other information that could reasonably be expected to be detrimental to public safety, including without limitation emergency or security plans, school safety plans, procedures, risk assessments, studies, measures, or systems; and - records or other information relating to the number of licensed security officers, school resource officers, or other security personnel, as well as any personal information about those individuals. 	<p>LES: #1-5 AEOPD:#1, 2, 5 IC: #1</p>

[Act 1084](#) of 2021. An act concerning the use of student restraints in public schools or educational settings.

Ark. Code Ann. § 6-15-1005. Safe, equitable, and accountable public schools.
General overall safety requirements.

Ark. Code Ann. § 6-17-113. Duty to report and investigate student criminal acts – Definitions.
Reporting requirements when a reasonable belief exists that any person has committed or threatened to commit an act of violence or any crime involving a deadly weapon on school property or while under school supervision.

Standards for Accreditation of Arkansas Public Schools and School Districts:

Standard 2-E.2: Each public school and public school district shall maintain appropriate materials and expertise to reasonably ensure the safety of students, employees, and visitors.
(D/C)

Standard 6-A.2: Each public school district shall adopt and implement school safety policies and procedures in accordance with the laws of the State of Arkansas and the rules of the Division. (D/P)

A.C.A. § 6-15-1005

Current through all acts of the 2021 Regular Session, First Extraordinary Session, Extended Session, Second Extraordinary Session, and the 2022 Fiscal Session including corrections and edits by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

AR - Arkansas Code Annotated > Title 6 Education > Subtitle 2. Elementary and Secondary Education Generally > Chapter 15 Educational Standards and Quality Generally > Subchapter 10 — Arkansas Public Education Act of 1997

6-15-1005. Safe, equitable, and accountable public schools.

(a)

- (1)** Arkansas schools will have safe and functional facilities.
- (2)** All school buildings will meet existing state and federal requirements.
- (3)** Instructional facilities will be designed and structured to support learning.

(b)

- (1)** The school climate will promote student achievement.
- (2)**
 - (A)** Every school and school district will enforce school district policies to ensure the safety of every student during school hours at school-sponsored activities.
 - (B)** These policies will include, at a minimum, policies on weapons, violence, tobacco, alcohol, other drugs, gangs, and sexual harassment.
- (3)** Every school and school district will enforce a code of behavior for students that respects the rights of others and maintains a safe and orderly environment.
- (4)** Every school and school district will have in place a policy on addressing disruptive students.
- (5)**
 - (A)** Every school and school district will offer appropriate alternative education programs organized to serve those students whose educational progress deviates from the standard expected for a successful transition to a productive life and those students whose behavior interferes with their own learning or the educational process of others.
 - (B)** School districts may serve the needs of these students through regional or cooperative efforts with other school districts.
- (c)** Local schools will work with parents, families, and business and community members to incorporate responsibility, character, self-discipline, civic responsibility, and positive work habits into adult contacts with students and to promote student demonstration of these behaviors.
- (d)** Every school will offer opportunities for students to be able to study and participate in the visual and performing arts, health and physical education, and languages.

(e) All public schools will participate in the state school improvement process:

(1)

A.C.A. § 6-15-1005

(A) Every school will engage in the collection and analysis of perceptual, archival, and achievement data in order to establish school and school district goals to improve student academic achievement.

(B) Students shall not be surveyed on values and beliefs;

(2) Every school will develop and implement a data-driven school-level improvement plan based on these analyses that leads to increased student achievement and continuous school improvement; and

(3) Every school will monitor and adjust the plan of action as necessary to promote increased student achievement and continuous school improvement.

(f)

(1) All public schools will have a plan of parental involvement.

(2)

(A) Every school will have a plan for allowing parents to be involved in the education of their children.

(B) These plans will address communication with parents, volunteering, learning activities that support classroom instruction, participation in school decisions, and collaboration with the community.

(3) Every school will involve parents in developing school goals and priorities and evaluating the effectiveness of the school-level improvement plan.

(g)

(1) All public schools will be accountable to the public they serve.

(2) All schools will participate in the Arkansas Educational Support and Accountability Act, [§ 6-15-2901](#) et seq.

(3) All schools will report to the parents the results of all assessments conducted to measure the achievement progress of their children.

(4)

(A) The highest performing schools will be recognized and rewarded.

(B) Schools reaching predetermined high levels of achievement will be granted charter status with approval of the charter petition by the Division of Elementary and Secondary Education.

(5) Each school will issue a school achievement report to the community on all statewide student assessments.

(h)

(1) All public schools will be led by qualified administrators.

(2) All administrators will demonstrate content knowledge in leadership, finance, organization, school climate, curriculum, and evaluation.

(3) In order for administrators to be able to renew a license, they must have participated in a continuing education and professional development program based on their school-level improvement plans, performance evaluation results, and student achievement scores.

History

[Acts 1991, No. 236, § 1](#); [1995, No. 1296, § 17](#); [1997, No. 1108, § 5](#); [2017, No. 936, §§ 15-19](#); [2019, No. 757, § 12](#); [2019, No. 910, § 1214](#).

Annotations

Notes

Amendments.

The 2017 amendment substituted “school-level” for “school” in (e)(2), (f)(3), and (h)(3); substituted “Arkansas Educational Support and Accountability Act, [§ 6-15-2901](#) et seq.” for “Arkansas Comprehensive Testing, Assessment, and Accountability Program” in (g)(2); and substituted “statewide student” for “state-required” in (g)(5).

The 2019 amendment by No. 757 substituted “plan” for “program” in (f)(1).

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Division of Elementary and Secondary Education” for “Department of Education” in (g)(4)(B).

Case Notes

Private Right of Action.

Arkansas Public Education Act, [§§ 6-15-1001 — 6-15-1007](#), does not expressly provide for a private right of action or for any kind of remedy; therefore, a school district and a bus driver could not have been sued over a student's rape based on alleged failures under [§ 6-15-1002](#) or this section. [Young v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 2013 Ark. App. 50, 425 S.W.3d 865 \(2013\)](#)

A.C.A. § 6-17-113

Current through all acts of the 2021 Regular Session, First Extraordinary Session, Extended Session, Second Extraordinary Session, and the 2022 Fiscal Session including corrections and edits by the Arkansas Code Revision Commission.

AR - Arkansas Code Annotated > Title 6 Education > Subtitle 2. Elementary and Secondary Education Generally > Chapter 17 Personnel > Subchapter 1 — General Provisions

6-17-113. Duty to report and investigate student criminal acts — Definitions.

(a) As used in this section:

(1) “Act of violence” means any violation of Arkansas law where a person purposely or knowingly causes or threatens to cause death or serious physical injury to another person;

(2) “Deadly weapon” means:

(A) A firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious physical injury; or

(B) Anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious physical injury; and

(3) “Firearm” means any device designed, made, or adapted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or any device readily convertible to that use, including such a device that is not loaded or lacks a clip or other component to render it immediately operable, and components that can readily be assembled into such a device.

(b)

(1) Whenever the principal or other person in charge of a public school has personal knowledge or has received information leading to a reasonable belief that any person has committed or has threatened to commit an act of violence or any crime involving a deadly weapon on school property or while under school supervision, the principal or the person in charge shall immediately report the incident or threat to the superintendent of the school district and the appropriate local law enforcement agency.

(2) The report shall be by telephone or in person immediately after the incident or threat and shall be followed by a written report within three (3) business days.

(3) The principal shall notify any school employee or other person who initially reported the incident that a report has been made to the appropriate law enforcement agency.

(4) The superintendent or his or her designee shall notify the local school district board of directors of any report made to law enforcement under this section.

(c)

(1) Whenever a law enforcement officer receives a report of an incident pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, that officer shall immediately report the incident to the office of the prosecuting attorney and shall immediately initiate an investigation of the incident.

(2) The investigation shall be conducted with all reasonable haste and, upon completion, shall be referred to the prosecuting attorney.

(3)

A.C.A. § 6-17-113

- (A) The prosecuting attorney shall implement the appropriate course of action and, within thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the file, the prosecuting attorney shall provide a written report to the principal.
- (B) The report shall state:
- (i) Whether the investigation into the reported incident is ongoing;
 - (ii) Whether any charges have been filed in either circuit court or the juvenile division of circuit court as a result of the reported incident; and
 - (iii) The disposition of the case.
- (4) Upon receipt of the report from the prosecuting attorney, the principal shall notify any school employee or any other person who initially reported the incident that a report has been received from the prosecuting attorney.
- (d) Excluding the reporting requirement set out in subdivision (c)(3) of this section, any person who purposely fails to report as required by this section shall be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.
- (e) The State Board of Education shall promulgate rules to ensure uniform compliance with the requirements of this section and shall consult with the office of the Attorney General concerning the development of these rules.

History

[*Acts 1995, No. 888, § 1*](#); [*1997, No. 1243, § 1*](#); [*1999, No. 1520, § 1*](#); [*2019, No. 315, § 223*](#).

Annotations

Notes

Amendments.

The 2019 amendment deleted “and regulations” following “rules” twice in (e).